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ABSTRACT
Schools chase test scores as a means of validating educational practices. Having imposed
high-stakes testing, public schools were still not generating the student test scores under
policies such as No Child Left Behind, the Department of Education thought would
ensue. To hold accountability on the part of the classroom teacher, Race to the Top, and
with it, merit pay was imposed by most states within the United States.
Using policy innovation and diffusion frameworks, this research looks at how over time
states have come to adopt value-added policies for teacher evaluations. The research
takes into consideration the sociopolitical systems that influence adoption of within the
K-12 system.
I test six key hypotheses using the event history methodology and building off previous
literature which focused on higher education, the research seeks to further the
understanding of educational policy diffusion and the driving factors for value-added
adoption. In the analysis of the data, it was found that both internal and external
determinants were key in understanding how and why value-added policies are adopted
by states.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Throughout the last 30 years, the concept and practice of accountability in U.S.
public education have undergone marked change. Early on, accountability often referred
to the “design of statewide governance structures capable of accommodating the
simultaneous need for institutional autonomy and external oversight of decision-making”
(McLendon et al., page 1, 2006). Therefore, the question needing to be addressed by
policy makers is: which activities and functions of educational institutions such as
academic programs and learning objectives should be dictated by the state and which
should be left for the schools or districts to decide (McLendon et al., 2006)?
Accountability became a function of governance systems capable of both effectively and
efficiently controlling resources and the decisions of campus leaders (Berdahl, 1971).
There are many reasons to study the determinants of state performanceaccountability or meritocratic policies in education. This era of new accountability, based
on meritocratic principles, represents a mile-marker in the dynamics of both federal-state
and state-district relationships, both of which touch on important findings for the
financing and governing of public education. The measurement of student performance,
and by extension teacher performance, assumes that if individuals work hard enough,
they can be successful at any endeavor. However, this ignores that factor that it is more
than effort that influences performance. Context has a heavy hand in outcomes. These
recent forms of accountability are based on measuring teacher performance through
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student exam scores. This approach is based on meritocratic principles applied to
education and a new avenue for achieving accountability in education.
Recent changes in how the public conceptualizes and implements practices of
accountability have not been uniform across states. In recent years, the increased amount
of meritocratic policies allows for researchers to test theories of both federal and local
governmental behavior within the education domain (McLendon et al., 2006). However,
not all states have implemented these meritocratic reforms or implemented identical
“reform trajectories” (McLendon et al., 2006). Therefore, it begs the question as to which
factors came into consideration for certain states to undertake the adoption of
meritocratic-oriented approaches. Further, what characteristics within the states account
for differences in the policy stances of the states? Put simply, why did states choose to
adopt accountability policies based on meritocratic principles when they did?
This dissertation reports the results of an empirical investigation into these
questions. I develop and test a theoretical model derived from previous state policy
literature looking at state innovation and diffusion. My theoretical model focuses on how
variations over time and across state sociopolitical systems influence policy adoption in
the education policy domain (McLendon et al., 2006). I use event history analysis (EHA)
to examine how certain state groupings and prior accountability policy adoption, as well
as economic, organizational, and political characteristics that make up individual states,
influenced the adoption of the meritocratic policy of value-added models during the time
period of 2011-2016. In the chapters that follow, I present a theoretical framework, six
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hypotheses, research design, analytic findings, and the conceptual implications of those
findings.
The policy of value-added models was the focus of the diffusion research in this
dissertation. Value-added models are an accountability tool used to measure the impact of
an individual teacher’s effect on student outcomes, in most cases, test scores. This is
accomplished by using a variety of measures to predict each student's test score and then
comparing these predicted scores to how the students actually scored on the test
(Aslantas, 2021). Most states have implemented some form of value-added models for
teacher evaluations.
Value-added models build off performance-based policies which were first seen
in higher education. Performance-based funding is any funding that is received
contingent on achieving specific outcomes. When concerning higher education,
performance-based funding was first used by states to ensure higher graduation rates
from institutions and tied state funds to the outcome. This ensured compliance with state
directives and served to hold institutions accountable.
This study seeks to explain why these tools of accountability diffuse amongst
states, specifically when looking at value-added models. Performance-based measures
occurred over a thirty-year period, where-as value-added policies diffused quicker over a
short six-year time period. I seek to attempt to explain the reasons for the rapid spread of
this latter policy.
A number of scholarly studies have been conducted concerning state innovation
and diffusion of public policies over the last five decades. Many publications that arose
3

throughout the 1970s and 1980s gave great insights into the determinants of
innovativeness within various policy areas (Berry and Berry, 1991). Further, the central
research question concerning state lead innovation was, “What causes a government to
adopt a new program or policy?” (Berry and Berry, 1991; Walker, 1969; Downs, 1976;
Grupp and Richard, 1975).
Internal versus External determinants
However, a critical weakness in the early state innovation literature is the
delineation of internal versus external determinants for why innovation occurred (Berry
and Berry, 1990). It was found that internal determinants in models would normally not
specify a role for regional influence (Downs, 1976). On the other hand, regional diffusion
models assumed that internal state characteristics have zero significant effects (Light,
1978). When both models for regional and internal determinants were examined together
within a single study, their analyses were kept separate (Berry and Berry, 1990). The
internal determinants model was used for analyses of the determinants of policy
innovation, while regional diffusion models looked more at policy emulation or diffusion
itself (Canon and Baum, 1981).
Further, neither a regional diffusion model nor an internal determinants model is a
an explanation of state innovation in by itself, but instead, a combination of both is
needed to best explain why policy diffusion occurred (Berry and Berry, 1990). Both
internal and regional influences on a state’s likelihood to adopt a new policy can be
predicted based on a theory by Mohr (1969) where he describes the propensity to
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innovate as a function of the strength of obstacles against innovation versus the
availability of resources for overcoming the same obstacles.

Diffusion of Meritocratic Policies and Performance-Based Funding
Through the recent accountability policies in education, it is assumed that what is
being developed are people who have the knowledge and skills to successfully contribute
to the nation's economy. This is a departure from the notion that the goal of education
was to develop citizens. And that this more recent approach is based on the idea that what
people achieve in society is based on merit. If citizens possess the ability and work hard
enough, they will accomplish their goals and reap the deserved rewards. The architects of
these recent policies apply to education. Additionally, if the appropriate measures of
performance can be developed and enticing incentives are offered, teachers will be justly
rewarded. If students perform well, teachers will be rewarded. If students perform poorly,
teachers will not be rewarded and may even lose their jobs. Either way, the outcome is
determined by teachers. They have control over the outcome that they face.
For meritocracy to work as intended, all who are within the system must start on
a level playing field. Meritocracy, in the context of public schools, is based on the
assumption that student educational performance can be measured using standardized
metrics. Thus, the performance of teachers and schools can be measured by how well the
students under their direction perform. It is also assumed that teachers and administrators
are rational actors who respond to inducements, both positive and negative. Thus,
performance-based funding has been offered as the inducement for teachers and schools
to improve student performance. This approach to education is based on the assumption
5

that it is fair to use the same standards for all students and schools. This assumption,
however, is problematic because of differing socioeconomic contexts and the fact that not
all students begin in the same place.
Additionally, differences in the social relationships both among and within
schools reflect the social backgrounds of the student body which will later influence their
future economic positions (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). It has been found that workingclass schools tend to emphasize behavioral control and rule-following, while schools in
higher socio-economic suburbs instead have open systems that foster greater student
participation, have less direct supervision, allow for more student electives, and stress
internalized standards of control (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Differences in the social relationships within schools are consequently reinforced
by inequalities in financial resources brought in by the institutions. The minute financial
support for the education of those in the lower socio-economic echelons allows more
resources to be set aside for the children of those with more outsized roles in the
economy (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Further, it forces upon the teachers and school
administrators in the blue collar schools a type of social relationship that closely mirrors
that of the factory (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Financial considerations in poorly
supported schools do not allow for smaller, more intimate classes, a multitude elective
courses (including STEM), and specialized teachers who are able to personally address
the needs of the students (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Well-funded schools, which generate large donations through the PTA and other
sponsored events, are attended by the children of the elite. They can therefore offer
6

greater opportunities for the development of student autonomy using independent work
and encourage other characteristics that will be required for adequate job performance in
the upper levels of the occupational hierarchy (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Meritocratic practices of accountability are not a new concept and were first seen
in education at the collegiate level. Within the past 40 years, the concept and practice of
accountability in U.S. public higher education have undergone major change due to
meritocratic policy measures enacted at the state level (McLendon, Heard, and Deaton,
2006). By 2003, 25 states had adopted a performance funding program (Burke and
Minassians, 2001). The movement of this new accountability represents a milestone
achievement in the changing campus and state relationship (McLendon, Heard, and
Deaton, 2006). This relationship holds important implications for the budgeting and
governing of schools of higher education, and for the ways in which elected officials
decide the value of these institutions (McLendon, Heard, and Deaton, 2006). Not all
states have undertaken these reforms, nor have all states sought to undertake identical
reform paths. Due to these inconsistencies, questions arise as to which factors drove
certain states to take the important step of adopting performance-oriented approaches
(McLendon, Heard, and Deaton, 2006).
Having implemented performance-based funding practices in higher education,
federal initiatives sought to implement similar meritocratic policies in K-12 in an attempt
to effect accountability measures. Because of this, in the last two decades educational
researchers have adopted value-added methods to evaluate student, teacher, and school
performance at an increasing rate (Papay, 2011). It is by examining test scores over time,
7

that value-added models appear to isolate the contributions of individual teachers and
schools to student achievement (Papay, 2011). Further, various states and districts have
begun using these models to identify and reward high-performing teachers (McCaffrey et
al., 2003). As value-added models have become increasingly widespread among states,
and carry higher stakes, questions concerning both the validity and reliability of their
results have grown in importance (Rivkin, 2005).
When considering the overall effectiveness of the meritocratic policies put into
place, the research community is divided over the usefulness of value-added models
(Rockoff, 2004). Some researchers state that the methodologies used to analyze overall
effectiveness do support claims that specific teachers increase student achievement
(Tekwe et al., 2004). Thus, compensation and accountability policies based on these
estimates would be justified (Sanders, 2000). Other researchers, however, have argued
that the many assumptions that underly these models make such claims have little basis
and that low stakes uses may be most appropriate (Koretz, 2002).
This system, designed to create an even playing ground for all students and give
minimum standards for achievement, has not only failed our students and staff, but
created a form of a caste system with those at the bottom rungs rarely being able to
propel themselves upward (Sandel, 2021). Additionally, there is disagreement over
whether the policies work. It is this disconnection between policy and the push for policy
adoption in the face of a lack of evidence supporting their effectiveness which begs the
question: what explains the adoption of these policies?
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Proposed Research Contribution
The models used in this research further the work of Walker (1969) who analyzed
almost 90 different policies that had been adopted prior to 1965. He revealed an adoption
pattern that explained the spread of public policies among states in which a regional
leader (cue state) adopted a given policy first, followed by neighboring states within the
same geographic region. Walker’s (1969) findings served to redirect research at that time
away from models that focused solely on the internal attributes of states and concentrate
research on state-to-state diffusion.
The research in this dissertation also builds on Berry and Berry’s (1992) research
with the use of event history analysis. In two groundbreaking studies, Berry and Berry
applied event history analysis in examining the likelihood that a state would adopt a
lottery (1990) or a new tax (1992) within a given year. Berry and Berry’s work
invigorated the policy research community’s interest in understanding the conditions that
can lead to a state’s propensity to adopt new policies. Additionally, Mintrom (1997) and
Wong and Shen (2002) examined the spread of charter school policies. Mooney and Lee
(1995) analyzed the adoption and spread of abortion regulation and death penalty laws.
Hays (1996) also assessed the determinants of state reform of various civil and criminal
statutes.
However, statistical evidence supporting the effects of diffusion are mixed and
without consensus among the academic community. Mooney (2001) noted that only 50%
of the 24 EHA models reported in studies of state policy diffusion that were published in
top political science journals in the 1990s contained positively and statistically significant
9

coefficients for the diffusion variable. Mooney (2001) also found that the early studies
conducted by Berry and Berry (1990 and 1992) contained a bias toward finding a positive
diffusion effect. It was found that they failed to use time controls to stabilize the hazard
rate.
I develop and test a theoretical model that was used in previous comparative state
policy and politics literature. The model focuses on how variations over time and across
state sociopolitical systems influence policy adoption in K-12 education. Event history
analysis allows for the examination of how certain demographic, economic,
organizational, and political characteristics of individual states, that influence the
diffusion processes among states (McLendon, Heard, and Deaton, 2006). My research
looks at catalysts for the adoption of meritocratic policies during the period of 2011-2016
by using event history analysis and to further explain why states quickly diffused the
policy of value-added models for merit pay. If one exists, I should be able to see the
diffusion pattern of the policy by states taking cues from border states.
The primary goal of the analyses within this research project is to compare the
effects of the variables on the rate of policy adoption. Event history analysis is used as
the analytical method (Cox,1972). Event history analysis was originally found within
medical research and used to study the timing of human deaths. It employs the use of
longitudinal data to estimate and predict the likelihood of an event (adoption) occurring
with time-varying variables (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002).
Event history analysis is increasingly being used in educational research as it
provides better measures than logistic regression when handling longitudinal data, time10

varying variables, and censoring (Ampaw and Jaeger, 2012). Cross-sectional techniques,
for example, logistic regression, assume variable effects remain constant across the event
of interest (in this case policy adoption). Also, variables that change over the studied
period of time have to be modeled as a different variable giving up degrees of freedom in
the estimation (Ampaw and Jaeger, 2012). By using event history analysis, I can
overcome these limitations by incorporating variables that change value across time
(Ampaw and Jaeger, 2012). In previous education policy literature, event history analysis
has been used in the research focused on higher education to model undergraduate
student retention and institutional graduations rates (Chen, 2007; Gross, 2008; Ishitani
and DesJardins, 2002). Further, I assume that only one outcome can occur (adoption) and
that once outcome occurs the subject (state) is no longer at risk (since adoption has
occurred, the state can no longer adopt the same policy). The assumption of a single
occurrence can be relaxed within the framework set forth (Andersen et al., 1993).
My research builds upon the previously discussed comparative state policy and
politics literature and policy emulation. Additionally, the research serves to highlight this
fractured system and explain why policies, though glossy in their presentation, continue
to be adopted. Additionally, I look at performance-based funding in higher education
which served as the testing grounds for further merit-based education iteratives. This is
followed by examining our system of high stakes testing couched within common core
policies.
Further, I will look at previous policies which value-added pay models are based
on. I will further explain the history of teacher-based merit pay within our system. It is by
11

understanding the history behind the policy, that I fully understand its advent and how it
was meant to better our student populations, making them more competitive in the world
market. The focus will be on policy adoption and diffusion in order to better understand
why these education policies continue to perpetuate.
The research seeks to explain value-added policy adoption in an effort to shed
empirical light on the rise and spread of these policies within states. I begin first by
developing a conceptual framework based on previous literature and to build
understanding of the value-added policy being diffused. Next, I present six hypotheses
that emanate from the empirical models that explain value-added policy adoption. I then
go on to describe the construction of a longitudinal data set containing indicators of the
factors that I believe may have shaped state involvement in value-added policies. Next, I
describe the research methods, which use event history analysis. Lastly, I will present
empirical findings and discuss the conceptual and analytical implications of this and
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Teaching and Meritocracy
Over the past four decades, there has been great concern over the quality of
education that students have been receiving in public schools in the United States.
Various explanations have been offered for why schools were “failing” beginning with a
report under the Reagan administration that was entitled “A Nation at Risk” (The
National Commission of Excellence, 1983). This report, along with many others like it
were catalysts for why state and local governments chose to adopt innovative education
policies in response to what they saw as ineptitudes within our current systems. The
education system beginning in the 1980’s assumed the meritocratic notion that people
will succeed if they are given the proper incentives to do so. It is by understanding
meritocracy within our education system, that I can better understand the driving factors
of why the policy diffuses between states.
In this chapter I will discuss socio-economic conditions and how they affect
meritocratic education principles. I will then turn to micro-credentials in education and
their proliferation. It is by understanding the background of meritocratic policies in
education and initiatives such as micro-credentials that we have a full purview of why
these policies continue to proliferate.
A Nation at Risk
The report “A Nation at Risk” (The National Commission of Excellence, 1983)
laid out in detail concerns the federal government had for education in the US.
Additionally, it looked at various studies and pointed to academic underachievement on
13

national and international scales (The National Commission of Excellence, 1983). A
Nation at Risk stated that average SAT scores dropped an average of 50 points in the
verbal section and about 40 points in the mathematics section throughout the period of
1963-1980 (The National Commission of Excellence, 1983). Further, nearly forty
percent of 17-year-olds tested could not successfully draw inferences from written
material, and only one-fifth could write a persuasive essay; while only one-third could
solve a mathematics problem that had multiple steps (The National Commission of
Excellence, 1983). The study highlighted unfavorable comparisons with students outside
the United States and stated that American students never came in first or second and, in
comparison with other industrialized nations, were often last (The National Commission
of Excellence, 1983).
In response to these and similar problems, the commission made thirty-eight
recommendations, divided them into five major categories which included: Content,
Standards and Expectations, Time, Teaching, Leadership and Fiscal Support. The
recommendations are as follows:
•

For content, the commission recommended four years of English, three
years of mathematics, three years of science, three years of social studies,
and (at least one-half year of computer science for all high school
students. The commission also recommends that students work toward
being proficient in at least one foreign language beginning in the
elementary grades.
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•

For standards and expectations, the commission warned against grade
inflation and recommends that four-year colleges raise admissions
standards and standardized tests of achievement such the SAT and ACT at
major transition points from one level of schooling to another, especially
from high school to college or work.

•

For time, the commission recommended that school districts, along with
State legislatures change to 7-hour school days, as well as a 200- to 220day calendar school year.

•

For teaching, the commission recommended that salaries for teachers be
professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based.
They also recommended that teachers needed demonstrate competence in
an academic discipline.

•

Lastly, for leadership and fiscal support, the commission pointed out that
the Federal government plays an essential role in addressing student
needs, especially those labeled gifted and talented, from disadvantaged
socioeconomic backgrounds, minority and language minority students,
and those under the special education heading. The commission also
pointed out that the Federal government also must help ensure compliance
with constitutional and civil rights and provide student financial assistance
and research and graduate training.

The report pledged additional federal funding to help states meet expectations that
were laid out. However, states were not required to adopt the recommendations from the
15

report. This report and ensuing directives were among the first steps taken by the federal
government that attached monetary incentives for compliance with federal standards.
Socio-economic Considerations
Due to the “A Nation at Risk” (The National Commission of Excellence, 1983)
report, many states chose to implement versions of the proposed recommendations. States
sought to attract individuals that would build up their economic workforce and allow for
the state to be competitive on a national scale. This was accomplished, in part, by having
a top-ranked school system.
Building on this new competitive system, many schools seek to attract the “best
and brightest” students to their programs (Crozier, 2018). This brings prestige to the
institution. In turn, donors become attracted to the institution, which allows for the school
and students to benefit from the additional funds, either in material ways such as
upgraded technology or through human capital in the form of additional staff. This will
also attract better trained staff which students will again be able to benefit from. This
system of filtering students based on prior achievement gaps sets up a system hierarchy
that students later down the chain can never benefit from (Sandel, 2020), creating larger
achievement, and ultimately, wealth gaps with public K-12 schools competing for
students through school choice initiatives.
It has been argued that education should be nationalist in its scope, committed to
the national interest, looking to increasing national wealth, productivity of its citizenry
and competitiveness, and to provide educational justice and equality of opportunity
(Brown and Tannock, 2009). Meritocracy has been used to establish a link between
16

individual effort, which is then mediated through education (Souto-Otero, 2010). The
working class and poor within the US are finding it increasingly difficult to access top
level education, training, and employment (Brown and Tannock, 2009).
McNamee and Miller (2004) people assume that an education based on
meritocratic principles rewards the bright, hard workers regardless of socioeconomic
status, but most Americans also think that is how the system does work in practice. In the
US, educational attainment and social mobility based on meritocratic principles is
positively correlated with their socioeconomic status. Certain groups of children may be
estimated as less worthy of advanced educational opportunities, even when their prior
options have been limited through academic access (Meroe, 2014).
In contrast, children from families with higher socio-economic status enter school
with greater cultural understandings often attend better equipped schools and therefore
have access to a wider range of academic supports and opportunities (Meroe, 2014).
Socio-economic backgrounds often overestimate the costs and underestimate the benefits
of education and training, and because of this, attach a low value to education (SoutoOtero, 2010). In other words, those in low socio-economic brackets tend to not see the
benefit in higher education in their long-term success. While proponents of the current
educational system regard systemic discrimination as a fallacy. Social and economic
inequality that exists is thought to be legitimate because it reflects the natural results of
poor personal choices (Sunquist, 2002).
Meritocratic arguments can help coverup significant inequalities when it comes to
access to high-caliber educational opportunities (Hostetler, Sengupta, and Hollett, 2018).
17

As a result, rather than improving the educational opportunities and quality for lowincome students, studies have shown that low-income parents are less able to take
advantage of choice options that are available (Hostetler, Sengupta, and Hollett, 2018).
Low-income parents’ choices are constrained by two factors: information and cost
(Sunquist, 2002). This rhetoric further blames individual students and their cultural or
family backgrounds for poor academic performances (Mills and Keddie, 2012). This
takes the focus away from the fact that larger school and societal factors can negatively
affect student achievement (Mills and Keddie, 2012). This is what Littler (2018) calls a
socially erosive ethic that is competitively self-interested.
A meritocratic approach to education ignores that not all students start off on the
same footing or are given the same advantages even in the public school system. In the
United States, private and public educational institutions from K-12 through college, are
expected to function as breeding grounds and identifiers of high talent and effort (Meroe,
2014). However, student investment is plagued with unequal distributions of funding and
pupil spending which begins at the state level.
If I look at two states, for example, I find that a rich state, like Connecticut,
spends on an average of $18,000 per pupil per year, while a poorer state, like Mississippi,
spends far less with average only $8,000 per pupil per year (Markovits, 2020). This
uneven distribution of spending can be seen even more acutely when looking at specific
towns within rich versus poor states and the ability for a school’s local PTA to funnel
even more funds into already thriving school populations. The Scarsdale Union Free
School District in New York has a median household income of $238,000 and spent
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about $27,000 per student. In contrast, the Barbourville Independent School District in
Kentucky with a median household income of $16,000 only spends the minimum $8,000
per student (Markovits, 2020). These trends tend to reflect gaps, surprisingly not between
the middle and poor classes, but instead between the middle and elite classes in society
(Markovits, 2020). School districts with higher household incomes have more options for
pulling additional resources when needed. These districts can raise taxes on real estate or
hold fundraisers which can bring in as much as $400,000 in one night at a local Chicago
elementary school in an elite part of the city (Markovits, 2020). The range of per pupil
spending is aligned with income brackets: a poor student in public K-12 schools will have
about $8,000 in spending, a middle-class student about $12,000, an upper middle-class
student $18,000, an elite student $27,000, and an elite private school topping off at
$75,000 (Markovits, 2020). This is unique to the United States with it being only one of
three nations in which public schools that serve more affluent students spend more per
pupil and have lower student/teacher ratios than public schools that serve less affluent
students (Markovits, 2020).
For any resemblance to a true meritocratic system to work within schools, funding
allotments must be redistributed to all public schools within the system (Crozier, 2018).
This would level the playing ground. Though some schools may distribute the funds
differently, the overall amount of funds that a school receives would be stagnant and
disallow parents from elite families to give an advantage their children in the publicschool setting.
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However, these additional funds received either through fundraising or additional
per pupil spending serve to better prepare students of elite parents for careers past their
K-12 schooling. The funds go to extracurricular enrichment such as science, math, coding
and robotics camps, all of which are highly sought-after skill sets. These programs tend to
complement, not just duplicate what is being done in the classroom (Markovits, 2020). It
has been found that those who participate in these activities are 70 percent more likely to
go on to college than students who are only occasionally involved in school clubs and
400 percent more likely than students who do not participate or have exposure to such
activities (Markovits, 2020).
Because elite parents, who have benefitted from the meritocratic system
themselves, they have the means to pay for further academic tutoring and high-stakes test
prep. The income/achievement gap for SATs as a result is substantial. Students from
families earning over $200,000 per year (the top 5 percent of earners) score 388 points
higher than students from families earning less than $20,000 per year (the bottom 20
percent of earners), and middle class students only score 135 points higher on average
than their poorer counterparts (Markovits, 2020). Academic attainment and performance
can be deemed as the seeking and accumulation of academic and cultural human capital
that is used to compete and trade later on the employment market (Meroe, 2014). This
demonstrates that social justice does not require the elimination of all inequalities, but
instead requires that the “differentially deserving” be “differentially rewarded” (Swift and
Marshall, 1997).
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The result was that as of 2016, 58 percent of Americans raised in households from
the top quartile of the income distribution earned bachelor’s degrees by age 24, with only
41 percent from the next quartile, 20 percent from the third quartile, and 11 percent from
the bottom quartile (Markovits, 2020). At this level of achievement, children from low
socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely than children from high socio-economic
backgrounds to continue with furthering their education beyond high school (SoutoOtero, 2010).
To try to combat the effects of opportunity, some critical educators increase
grades as an act of resistance to meritocracy. Further, some educators advocate for noncompetitive forms of education, while other educators try to work within a meritocratic
system to make meritocracy more equitable (Crozier, 2018).
As a public good, education in the United States is held as the principal means by
which the youngest citizens are prepared to participate in our democratic society and
eventually have the skills to negotiate the labor market (Meroe, 2014). The scarcity of
high-quality educational resources and credentials can undermine the stores of human
capital. This threatens the perpetuation of a sufficiently informed electorate and a
competent labor force on a domestic and global scale (Meroe, 2014).
Students within low socio-economic strata often find that their years spent in
“inferior” public schools did not prepare them for success. In addition, they are able
recognize that they lacked both the economic and social resources necessary to compete
with the other privileged students (Sunquist, 2002). Although given the opportunity to
engage, they were not provided with the tools necessary to succeed (Sunquist, 2002).
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In his book, “How Meritocracy Works,” Markovits (2020) describes education as
the labor market’s preferred sorting mechanism and goes further to state that the
economic return from schools in terms of the labor market has become astronomical. This
amounts to the better the schooling, the better the job and paycheck that follows. This
creates a meritocratic loop where elite students, coming from advantaged backgrounds,
are set up to go to and succeed within the nation’s top universities through a system of
grooming set forth by the previous generation and worn like a badge by the current one.
It has been found that the median college graduate with a BA (Bachelor of Arts), will
earn more over their lifetime than 93 percent of workers without a high school degree and
86 percent of workers with only a high school degree (Markovits, 2020). Should that
graduate go on and further their education with a professional graduate degree, they will
over their lifetime make more than 99 percent of those without a high school degree, 98
percent more than those possessing only a high school degree, and 83 percent more than
workers with only a BA (Markovits, 2020). Further, this has produced a minimal standard
of education for the majority of students while reserving the best educational
opportunities for the economic (and meritocratic) elite (Meroe, 2014).
In her 2020 study, Reay spoke with K-12 teachers and questioned their view
specifically on meritocracy concerning standardized testing. The most common issue
highlighted by the participants was the lack of a level playing field, with more than half
feeling that the existing system was flawed because of the different socio-economic
backgrounds of students. Interestingly, most of the participants (17 of 30) felt that the
state had to be actively involved in levelling the playing field by redistributing
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educational resources to disadvantaged groups. Less privileged students should first be
given an advantage to have the same starting point as others. This was because she felt
that it was not fair for these students to work harder just because of their less
advantageous backgrounds (Reay, 2020).
Within the same study, in contrast, others were concerned about rewarding other
forms of talent (Reay, 2020). They felt that the non-academically inclined students with
different talents would not be rewarded or appreciated in our current education system
that places great emphasis on standardized tests. The teachers’ perspectives on
meritocracy, including their understandings of the costs and restrictions of the concept as
well as their inability to extend their resistance by creating alternative systems, appeared
to be mostly canceled out by the discourse about the meritocratic system (Reay, 2020).
The teachers’ responses largely reflected their acceptance of these state-dominated
initiatives, although a significant proportion of them asserted that the system resulted in
the mimicking and legitimation of the interests of elites (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977).
Ultimately, meritocratic arguments are as vital to justifying the perpetuation of
failure and mediocrity for the majority as they are to rewarding the privileged and worthy
few (Meroe, 2014). It is because of this, according to many scholars, education should be
viewed as a non-merit-based aspect of society (McNamee and Miller, 2004). However,
meritocratic principles, such as being in charge of your own educational trajectory, have
become a part of public education through government policies. These policies including
performance-based funding which can be found in higher education and federal policies
such as No Child Left Behind, along with Race to the Top. The focus on individual
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achievement and mobility is problematic because it can have a significant negative
impact on relations within the larger community since not everyone starts off the same
(Ho, 2021). Children connect educational success and failure to their own senses of
individual self-worth and future prospects (Reay, 2020).
Micro-Credentials
With the understanding that all students do not begin on an even playing ground,
states turned their attention on how best to address the issue of low-performing schools.
One mechanism that was used in an attempt to attract better qualified teachers to lower
socio-economic schools was micro-credentials. Micro-credentials are assessments of
learning and demonstrations of skill and competency (Berry and Byrd, 2019). For
example, micro-credentials can be used to support teachers in their development of skills
needed to teach English language learners. Another benefit of micro-credential training is
that it is often delivered online, making it more accessible to rural educators and those
who need to engage in professional learning in the evening, on weekends, or during
school breaks (Berry and Byrd, 2019). Additionally, states who use micro-credentials
demonstrate their support for educators’ abilities to understand what their own
professional learning needs may be. Micro-credentials can be used to better understand
what teachers know and can do, as well as a way to develop personalized systems of
professional learning for any teacher or administrator (Berry and Byrd, 2019).
Micro-credentials are attractive to teachers because the credentials create a way
for teachers to “free themselves from a one-size-fits-all” approach to professional
development (Berry and Byrd, 2019). Further, micro-credentials are content-focused,
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job-embedded, and they incorporate active learning (Berry and Byrd, 2019). Microcredentials are a way for schools, districts, and states to create systems of professional
learning that allow for teachers take control of their own learning, demonstrate evidence
of impact, and demonstrate what they have accomplished (Hunt et al., 2020).
Additionally, about three in four US teachers already are engaged in some form of
informal professional development or learning (Berry, 2017). While working with microcredentials can be either formal or informal, they are a way for teachers to be recognized
for the skills they have (LaMagna, 2017). As stated earlier, an online platform provides
new ways for school districts to recognize which teachers and administrators are trained
in teaching certain skills and/or leading improvement efforts as well as providing highly
personalized professional learning to help individuals with specific needs (Olcott, 2022).
As an innovation, micro-credentials are still in an early stage. However, a
growing number of states and districts, as well as the nation’s largest teachers’ union, are
experimenting with them (Berry and Byrd, 2019). A growing number of districts are also
piloting micro-credentials. Teachers who earn micro-credentials may receive a salary
increase, a one-time stipend, continuing education credit hours and graduate credit (Hunt
et al., 2020).
Even with this additional training through micro-credentials, the ailments that
often plague our public schools are whittled down to the easiest and most convenient
common denominator: the classroom teacher. Micro-credentials are a tool used to
improve teacher quality, improve student outcomes, and meet the demand for teachers in
specific subjects and locations. Additionally, districts and schools are implementing these
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policies to increase teacher recruitment and retention (Podgursky, 2006; Reed, Rueben,
and Barbour, 2006). Several states have recently enacted targeted teacher recruitment
legislation in one or more of the following areas to attract teachers to high-need schools
and subjects such as English and mathematics. These recruitment measures include
convening work groups and collecting teacher supply and demand data. The measures
give state and local education agencies the flexibility to design their own targeted teacher
recruitment strategies which include four economic incentives: (1) Creating career
pathways and grow-your-own programs for high school students. (2) Altering teacher
preparation and licensure requirements. (3) Providing financial incentives such as
scholarships/grants, loan forgiveness and hiring bonuses/salary increases. (4) Providing
incentives for retired teachers to return to the profession (Aragon, 2019).
The four economic incentives listed in the prior paragraph may be ongoing or
only enacted for a limited amount of time. The incentives may be awarded on receipt of a
particular certification, or as a bonus to a teacher’s salary for already holding a given
credential (Strunk and Zeehandelaar, 2011). As an example, districts may choose to pay
teachers more if they hold a particular credential in a high-needs subject area or if they
choose to work in a target school (Murphy and DeArmond, 2003). Nationally,
approximately 10 percent of school districts offer salary enhancements to teachers in
high-need subject areas such as math, science, and special education (Murphy and
DeArmond, 2003), with states like Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Oklahoma having
implemented bonuses for math and science teachers (Johnson, 2006).
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Further, school districts may incentivize teaching in schools that are considered
“hard-to-staff” because the geographic location or demographic makeup of the school
may seem undesirable (Strunk and Zeehandelaar, 2011). The advent of incentivized
wages for teachers in urban areas was first enacted in the late 1950’s (Conant, 1961).
Additionally, large mostly urban districts like Los Angeles have been using teacher
incentivization in order to attract high-caliber teachers to hard-to-staff schools (United
Teachers of Los Angeles, 2009). Rural districts who also struggle to recruit and retain
teachers due to social, cultural, and professional isolation and lower salaries, and are also
using economic incentives to attract teachers (Collins, 1999).
However, there is some evidence that districts use targeted economic incentives to
help mitigate their shortage needs and use fiscal incentive policies like teacher incentives
as a means of accomplishing this goal (Kolbe and Strunk, 2010; Prince, 2003). Teacher
incentivization is an attempt to address lower socio-economic school needs in hard-tostaff areas and bring a collective awareness of and commitment to public education from
early childhood through secondary levels (Baum and McPherson, 2011).
Summary
In this chapter I looked at merit practices interact with socio-economic conditions
of a state and further micro-credentials. Though meritocratic principles can allow for
advancement, not everyone begins at the same point within the education system which
skews how quickly individuals can advance. To help remedy this, micro-credentials are
used to attract educators and allow them to have control over their professional
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development and showcase the skills they have chosen to develop. Further these
credentials allow for schools to incentivize educators to teach at hard-to-staff schools.
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CHAPTER 3
Performance-Based Funding in Higher Education
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the first appearance of accountability
practices in education. These principles first appeared in public education at the
college/university level in the form of performance-based funding. Institutions of higher
education in the United States have traditionally been funded based on a combination of
prior appropriated amounts and on state budgets, along with the number of enrolled
students (Layzell, 1999). The new approach is a departure from the traditional approach
to funding. Then you can state that these policies may have served as the precursor to the
adoption of value-added models in K-12 education.
In the following chapter I will being going briefly over the background of how
performance-based funding came to a policy proliferated in higher education. Next,
performance-based funding will be viewed through the lens of principal-agent theory and
explain how institutions being agents had to answer to their principal being the state. The
chapter will then turn to the how the private business sector further influences this policy.
Lastly, the two waves of the policy with PBF 1.0 followed years later by PBF 2.0 and
their driving factors will be examined.
In this study, I focus on how states that adopted performance-based funding also
adopted the value-added model of teacher evaluations. This creates a system of
accountability which was tested in higher education and trickled down to K-12. With
higher education being the catalyst for further meritocratic practices, such as value-added
models, I should see a trickle-down effect of policy diffusion.
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Performance-Based Funding Background
In the 1960’s and 70’s, accountability in education often referred to the design of
state policies (McLendon et al., 2006). The central question policymakers tried to answer
was which activities and functions of institutions of higher education (such as academic
programs, budgets, and tuition setting) should be dictated by the state and which should
be left to the discretion of the leaders on campuses (McLendon et al., 2006). The
accountability focus, therefore, was on the design of governance systems that made it
possible to both effectively and efficiently regulate the flow of state resources to a
campus (Berdahl, 1971).
This approach was promoted by the Reagan administration and its call to arms
through the publication, “A Nation at Risk” (1983) which was briefly discussed in the
previous chapter. The report stated that the educational foundations of our society were
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatened our very future as a Nation and
a people (U.S. Department of Education, 1983).
Additionally, the report called for elected officials, educators, parents, and
students to reform the public school system, which was deemed in urgent need of
improvement (U.S. Department of Education, 1983). Numerous statistics were used to
demonstrate the dire state of the current educational system and the inadequate quality of
an American education. The main takeaway was that the nation was at risk, and the report
further expressed concern that the once unchallenged superiority in commerce, industry,
science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by US competitors (U.S.
Department of Education, 1983).
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The report suggested that there were specific things we, as a country, could do to
reverse our current course and to bring American education to safety. This included
several key points:
1. More rigor: In the educational sense, “rigor” means to make something more
difficult. The report suggested that states increase the rigor of their curricula, challenging
students to do better and graduate smarter (A Nation at Risk: Summary and Effects on
Education, 2014).
2. New standards: Some states had already written standards, which stated that
students would have to accomplish certain things to move through the grades and
eventually graduate high school. The report was concerned that even those states that did
have standards set the bar so low that the students really did not have to do much of
anything in order to pass the course/grade (A Nation at Risk: Summary and Effects on
Education, 2014).
3. Teacher preparation and pay: The report specifically noted that some teacher
training programs did not provide adequate training for teachers. In addition, teachers
were paid far less than other fields that required a college degree. As a result, there was a
shortage of qualified teachers, especially in areas like science and math. Among other
teacher-related recommendations, the report suggested that teacher training programs
require more of prospective teachers and that teacher pay be tied directly to student
achievement (A Nation at Risk: Summary and Effects on Education, 2014).
What was proposed as an answer to the posed problem was a system of
performance funding, which differed from traditional enrollment-based funding (Burke,
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2002). Performance-based funding entails allocating state dollars using a precise formula
that ties appropriations to student performance measures at the institution level (Hiler,
2018). State officials believed in accountability, not solely in higher education but across
governmental activities and funding (Dougherty and Natow, 2015).
These accountability measures called for a refocusing of attention on outcomes of
campus activities, rather than the traditional focus on inputs alone (Zumeta, 1998). Key
performance indicators were introduced in higher education and determined a certain
amount of each institution’s state appropriation (Jones, 2004). The goal was to increase
quality, measured as efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, and self-regulation
through effective top-down leadership (Dougherty and Natow, 2019).
Commonly used metrics with performance-based funding include the number of
degrees completed, graduation rates, job placement rates, and milestone accomplishments
such as year-to-year retention rates (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013). In scrutinizing
outcomes, state policymakers have sought to influence institutional behavior for the
purpose of improving institutional performance (McLendon et al., 2006). This approach
links state appropriations to school performance on metrics like graduation rates (Burke
and Minassians, 2003). Under these policies, the relationship between performance and
funding is predetermined. If an institution meets a specified “performance target” it
receives a specific amount or percentage of state funding (Burke and Minassians, 2003).
Reasons behind the shift in policy to a form of accountability through
performance-based funding include globalization which brought pressure from the
business community for campuses to maximize productivity and efficiency (Burke,
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2005). There were recent shifts in the theory and practice of public-sector way of
governing which placed valued on decentralization, entrepreneurship, and a greater
emphasis on markets, competitiveness, and the measurement of performance (Burke,
2005). There were also extreme financial pressures placed on state governments
throughout the 1990’s, which served to call into question funding for higher education
(Burke and Serban, 1997). Further, there were changes in state political leaders, with
newer ones being more likely to implement policies that increased accountability in
higher education (Burke, 2005). Lastly, there was a failure of the earlier “voluntary
assessment” to demonstrate to elected officials that institutions of higher education were
capable, without coercion, of meeting growing accountability demands (Burke and
Serban, 1997).
Principal/Agent Theory
Performance-based funding also calls upon principal-agent theory, where the state
is the principal and the agents are the educational institutions. The principal-agent model
has been used successfully to understand a wide range of relationships between political
institutions and other actors. It has also been used as a means of examining interactions
between the states and the federal government (Fowler, 2020), the states and counties
(Rasmussen, 2000), and the state and educational leaders at the local level (Seashore and
Robinson, 2012). For instance, Enders, de Boer, and Weyer (2013) used a principal-agent
model to examine the autonomy and performance of reforms within higher education and
the ways in which the reforms were enacted.
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Principal-agent theory examines the degree to which principals can exert control
over the behavior of agents to stop the latter from shirking or following their own
agenda. Principals use agents to accomplish their goals because the principal lacks the
necessary resources or because the costs of achieving such goals are prohibitively
high. The basis for any principal-agent relationship derives from the condition of mutual
advantage (Eggertsson, 1990; Maltzman, 1997). In other words, principals use agents,
and likewise, agents choose to be used because there exists some form of mutual
payoff. The existence of such mutual advantages provides the principal with the ability to
impose their goals on the agent, while reinforcing a relationship of dependency by
attaching the agent’s behavior to those goals (Eisner and Meier, 1990). In the case of
performance-based funding, the mutual payoff would be that the educational institutions
(agents) receive state funds and the state (principal) sees a high yield return on their
investment in the form of increased graduation rates.
It is often found that agents are not committed to the goals of their principals and
often shirk their duties. This leads to carrot and stick type policies that can errode the
morale and commitment of employees who are motivated intrinsically (Andersen and
Pallesen, 2008). For instance, a faculty member at a leading university described the
situation of being responsible for graduation rates as “demoralizing” (Dougherty et al.,
2016). The assumption of this type of funding is that educators are not working hard
enough, and that they are not willing to change, nor improving (Dougherty et al., 2016).
Similarly, the focus on the use of monetary incentives, as well as performance monitoring
as the main motivators is used to move institutions in the directions desired by elected
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leaders within states. Institutions in higher education are conceptualized as having
interests that can run counter to those of the state leader’s desires, material incentives and
monitoring via performance metrics are seen as necessary to align both motives and to
keep institutions in line (Broucker and DeWit, 2015). This is accomplished through
monetary incentives (Dougherty et al., 2016). The state’s ultimate goals are higher
graduation rates, more research dollars coming in, and additional efficiency in the higher
education system. If the institutions implement things that align with state goals and
policies, then the state will monetarily support the effort. This boils down to a simple
financial incentive model (Dougherty et al., 2016).
Business and Performance-Based Funding
In some states, business leaders also directly lobbied state governments to implement
performance-based funding to secure and even design the system (Dougherty and Natow,
2019). In the state of Indiana, the leaders within the Chamber of Commerce testified in
favor of performance-based funding and directly sent messages to fellow Chamber
members supporting it (Dougherty and Natow, 2015). However, business also had an
indirect effect, by shaping the context of ideas in which policymakers operated and by
affecting the incentives government officials faced (Dougherty and Natow, 2019).
Performance-based funding is consistent with the privatization movement. By promoting
the idea of improving efficiency through privatizing numerous governmental services and
making government agencies use business-like approaches, colleges would be subjected
to market-like constraint. Business made it more likely that state officials would view
performance-based funding as a desirable and politically attractive policy for higher
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education (Dougherty and Natow, 2019). State officials recognize that securing “business
confidence” is vital to getting businesses to invest in the venture and further, to generate
jobs and tax revenues, all of which politically benefit government officials and the state
as a whole (Block, 1987).
Support for performance-based funding stems from two main motives. First,
higher education supports performance-based funding because leaders of institutions
share the belief of state government officials that it will improve higher education
outcomes (Ness et al., 2015). This can be seen when a state community college leader in
Florida stated, “I think the philosophy of performance funding is just a basic concept that
should be embraced by everybody. I honestly believe that whether higher education
institutions get more money or not, that they should be out there trying to get the best
performance that they possibly can” (Dougherty and Natow, page 71, 2015). The second
motivating factor is that many leaders of higher education institutions believe that
performance-based funding provides them with a new way to legitimate themselves in the
eyes of elected government officials and the public.
PBF 1.0 and 2.0
In 1979, Tennessee became the first state to adopt a performance-based funding
policy in which a portion of state appropriations to public higher education was directly
tied to student outcomes. Adoption and implementation took place over two waves with
other states following Tennessee’s lead in the following decades.
The first wave of policy adoptions that took place in the 1990s (over a decade
after first implementation) and is referred to in the literature as PBF 1.0 (Ortagus et al.,
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2020). Initially, PBF programs consisted of pools of money that were used to reward
colleges who met performance targets. As such, these funds were in addition to the state
appropriation to a school. (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013). Many performance-based
funding states suspended or discontinued the policies during tight fiscal times. This is
because PBF 1.0 programs which offered a bonus or supplement were difficult to
maintain when state governments were reducing expenditures (Dougherty et al., 2012). In
addition to tight state budgets brought on by fluctuating economic conditions, other
factors that attributed to the collapse of PBF 1.0 were an insufficient buy-in among key
stakeholders and a loss of political support for these programs (Burke and Modarresi,
2000). From 1979 to 2010, 12 of 25 states that had adopted PBF shifted to lower-stakes
policies, such as performance budgeting or performance reporting (Miller and Morphew,
2017). A performance budget reflects the input of resources and the output of services.
The goal is to identify and score relative performance based on goal attainment for
specified outcomes, in this case graduation rates. Performance reporting defines and
measures overall success of the policies implemented. It provides an overview of how the
entity is performing by collecting specific performance data, analyzing it, and provide
suggestions to help in making decisions. The results were that states had not given up on
accountability measures, they instead transitioned to tools that were less expensive.
The second wave of performance-based funding adoptions took place in the late
2000’s and is referred to as PBF 2.0. The second wave included two key differences from
the PBF 1.0 policy. First, instead of having bonus funds, PBF 2.0 placed a portion of base
state appropriations in limbo to coerce institutional change and to make PBF recession37

proof (as the first one was not) (Ortagus et al., 2020). In this new wave of policy,
institutions of higher education could potentially see a decline in state financial support if
institutional performance did not meet specified goals. Second, states tied a larger portion
of funding to outcome measures, with several states allocating more than 10% of higher
education appropriations to institutional performance outcomes (Friedel et al., 2013).
PBF 2.0 focused specifically on college attainment and completion, and used that often
included metrics such as student retention and institutional degree productivity
(Dougherty and Natow, 2015). PBF 2.0’s increase in adoption coincided with the
economic crisis and constrained state budgets for higher education (Miller and Morphew,
2017). Newly elected policymakers were giving increased attention to public financing of
higher education, making it a salient agenda item (Dougherty and Natow, 2015).
Additionally, President Obama issued a call to increase the number of college graduates
and explored a number of policy options to reach this goal by 2020, which further served
to fuel the diffusion of PBF 2.0 policies (Miller and Morphew, 2017).
For these new PBF policies, the amount of funding provided per full-time
equivalent student in public universities is an indicator of a state’s investment in the
higher education of its students (Science and Engineering State Indicators, 2021). Funds
allocated towards higher education are expected to produce a return in the form of human
capital. Unlike previous methods of funding which based the allocation of state tax
dollars on student enrollment, performance-based funding in higher education ties state
funds given to public colleges and universities to educational outcomes. This serves to
incentivize institutions and improve student outcomes while holding institutions
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accountable for results. Institutions of higher education are heavily reliant on state
funding, and therefore are likely to be responsive to performance-based funding systems
since an important source of their revenue is at stake (Ortagus et al., 2020).
The Effect of Performance-Based Funding
Performance-based funding was seen as the solution to a funding mechanism that
failed to reward colleges for actually graduating students. The shift to performance-based
funding put a laser focus on college completion rates. It was found that only 59% of those
who started college intent on earning a bachelor’s degree did so within 6 years
(Undergraduate Retention Rates, 2017). When concerning associate degrees and
certificate programs, only a staggering 29% of students graduated within 3 years (Hiler,
2018). As previously stated, education beyond the high school level has become
increasingly necessary to earn a living wage. Those states that had enrollment-based
funding understood that funding increased college entry but did not translate to college
completion. Under this previous approach to funding, institutions of higher education
faced no consequences should students failed or simply withdrew from school. For this
reason, states with lower rates of postsecondary educational attainment were more likely
to pursue performance funding to try to increase graduation rates (Li, 2017).
The motivation of the policy is to reduce government funding at the same time as
secure greater efficiency from various public agencies, including higher education
institutions. In order to accomplish this, top government officials try to create pseudomarkets for those institutions by using market-like incentives to encourage competition
for both clients and public support (Hood, 2006).
39

Institutions with more financial resources such as research universities in
performance-based funding adopting states were more likely to use evidence to build
internal models and identify where to focus their efforts to get a larger share of the
funding (Ortagus et al., 2020). In contrast, institutions with fewer resources were less
likely to come up with how best to allocate funds. Instead, these latter incentives rely on
state directives to stay in compliance and ensure state funds would continue to be
allocated to their institution (Thorton and Friedel, 2016).
Further, the nature of performance-based funding changes incentive structures for
public colleges and universities (Snyder, 2015). However, states that have adopted these
policies have demonstrated few spending changes in terms of funding at state or
institutional levels. Results from various analyses of performance-based funding indicate
that states do not necessarily give more money to colleges and universities based on
outcome measures (Rabovsky, 2012).
Research on the implementation of performance-based funding finds extensive
evidence of resistance and gaming on the part of higher education institutions (Rabovsky,
2012). US institutions frequently resist the demands of state governments that they
pursue certain outcomes standards (Li, 2017). The institutions attempt to disguise their
resistance by using such devices as reducing course and program demands on students so
they can pass at higher rates (Rhodes and Sporn, 2002). This allows for institutions to be
able to meet government officials’ desire for higher graduation numbers without having
to make many changes in their established organizational practices (Dougherty et al.,
2016).
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Studies of performance-based funding have also pointed to the fact that a major
obstacle to the ability of higher education institutions to meet the demands of the policy
is the actual make-up of their student bodies (Schulze-Cleven and Olsen, 2017). Colleges
and universities find it difficult to produce as many graduates or to find jobs for their
graduates as demanded if many of the students entering those colleges are not well
prepared academically or have face other disadvantages (McKinney and Hagedorn,
2019). Higher education institutions are also delayed by the fact that the outcomes
desired by state policy makers often take a time to occur. The median four-year college
student takes six years to graduate so it takes a long time for institutions to demonstrate
the effects that their political principals are expecting (Kelchen, 2018).
In the case of performance-based funding, the goals laid out by policy makers
have been characterized as improved instructional, student-support, and researchadministration efforts. Further, the goal is to have improved student outcomes, degree
completion and faculty research productivity (de Boer et al., 2015). The most common
campus-level changes include improved advising and counselling services, a retooling of
developmental education, and streamlining transfer processes (Jenkins et al., 2009).
In the case of graduation numbers, the effects of performance-based funding
were found to be weak or even nonexistent (Bell et al., 2018). Rutherford and Rabovsky
(2014) reported that early performance-based programs were not correlated with
improved student performance at public 4-year institutions. In their analysis of twelve US
studies, Bell et al. (2018) found that the average impact of degree completion is not
distinguishable from zero. Similarly, in a study of the performance-based funding
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programs implemented in Ohio and Tennessee, Hillman et al. (2018) found no effect on
baccalaureate and associate degree “production.” What was found was that there was a
significant impact on degree production but argued that it came at the expense of greater
effort to raise baccalaureate and associate degree completion (Hillman et al., 2018). This
comes at the expense of considerable compliance costs, involving additional management
and administration for colleges to carry out those policies (Kivisto, 2007; Gray et al.,
2001).
Further, it has been found that proposed reforms may result in reductions in the
quality of services as institutions scramble to keep up with heightened competition, as
well as declining revenues, by reducing the quality of the services they provide (Kivisto,
2007). In order to improve graduation rates, institutions have resorted to weakening
academic demands through the practice of inflating grades and reducing the number of
difficult courses required for graduation (Dougherty et al., 2016).
To add to an already declining educational rigor, performance-based funding has
been seen as reducing the intake of less advantaged students, constructing of institutional
missions, stratification of institutions, growing stratification of the academic labor force,
and a decrease in motivation on the part of higher education personnel (Dougherty and
Natow, 2019). Institutions have become more restrictive in admissions which can be seen
by their raising their academic requirements, focusing their recruitment activities on
secondary schools with more advantaged students, and targeting financial aid awards
towards students via “merit” as versus those with need-based aid (Dougherty et al.,
2016). This is due to merit students being more likely than need-based students to
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graduate. Additional studies of performance-based funding have identified the danger
that this practice can increase inequality within the institution by financially penalizing
poorer performing institutions, which further hinders their ability to improve their
performance (Dougherty and Natow, 2019). For instance, in their study of community
colleges in the state of Texas, McKinney and Hagedorn (2017) found that Black students,
Hispanic students, adult students, and part-time students secured significantly less
performance-based funding for community colleges relative to more advantaged students.
This further demonstrates that these policies may contribute to a lack of resources at
colleges and universities that serve large numbers of minority students and widens
already-existing resource gaps within institutions of higher education.
Ortagus et al. (2020), in their study of 52 empirical articles published between
1998 and 2020, examined the intended and unintended consequences of performancebased funding policies in American higher education. Their study shows that most of the
peer-reviewed academic research on the effectiveness of performance-based funding in
the United States typically reveals null or modest effects of the policies on the
institutional outcomes primarily targeted by the policies.
Thus, there is little evidence that that performance-based funding in higher
education produces better student retention and graduation rates (Dougherty and Natow,
2019). Rather, performance-based funding produces many unintended impacts that are
often ignored by institutions in order to stay in compliance with set policy (Naidoo,
2011). This, instead, points to compliance costs and drops in output quality but does
nothing to anticipate other unintended consequences. These consequences include
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reduced admission to less advantaged students, narrowing of institutional missions, rising
inequality within the institutions, a growing stratification of the academic labor force, and
lowered motivation of higher education personnel (Lane, 2008).
The potential benefits of performance-based funding can only come to fruition if
efforts are made within institutions to systematically address the many obstacles that are
encountered in realizing its intended impacts, as well as the unintended impacts
(Morginson, 2009). The design of performance-based funding must be rooted in research
designs and theories that rely on political science and social and organizational
psychology (Pusser, 2008). This provides a better understanding of policy design and
implementation than the economic formulations on which it currently relies (Pusser,
2008). Internal and external organizational factors, in addition to environmental ones are
typically ignored by those who are designing these policies. They are therefore ignoring
the varied needs, interests, goals, and “power resources” of multiple stakeholders (Davis
et al., 1997). Also being ignored is how higher educational institutions are shaped by
their communities, workforce, leadership, culture, organizational resources and
processes, and the economy (Davis et al., 1997).
In an attempt to better understand the diffusion of performance based funding
policies despite evidence that questions the policy’s effectiveness, Miller and Morphew
(2017) looked at the policy through the lens of framing theory. Framing theory helps to
identify competing schemas for understanding and communicating the same data to
advance political objectives (Rein and Schon, 1996). Further, frames define policy
problems and propose policy solutions by simplifying and making sense of information
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understood by policymakers and the broader public (Miller and Morphew, 2017). They
found that by framing information, political actors create narratives that advance their
interests. A narrative describes the source policy problem source and offers a solution
that potentially resolves the issue. Narratives additionally allow actors to restrict and
control the decision making of public policymaking (Miller and Morphew, 2017).
Political actors incite action through what is known as motivational framing
which is openly enlisting policymakers’ support to enact change and influence the
political process (Schulock and Snyder, 2013). Frames that rely upon rhetoric from broad
public narratives are more likely to be picked up by fellow policymakers and later be
enacted (Rein and Schon, 1996).
By defining policy problems that are resolvable through government intervention,
state leaders are able to have sway over the policy agenda (Stone, 1989). Accordingly,
Miller and Morphew (2017) used state leaders as agenda-setters because they work to
generate and control political debate. What they found was that political actors submit a
problem as the subject of policy decision. The leaders then influence the policy stream to
control which policy ideas gain momentum and which policy ideas are then excluded
(Kingdon, 1984). Therefore, policymakers believe there is a policy problem, the political
actor’s identified mechanism causes the policy problem, and the political actor’s
proposed solution will resolve the problem (Miller and Morphew, 2017).
The use of a framing of a problem to influence the policy agenda set the stage and
made a salient case for the acceptance and implementation of performance-based funding
policies within states. Further, these agenda setting organizations encourage
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policymakers to adopt performance-based funding through motivational framing by
associating the policies with already significant calls for accountability when facing
constrained state budgets (Greenstein, 2015). This allows for the political buy-in of the
narrative being put forth. Additionally, performance-based funding was equated with
progressive thinking and innovation (Miller and Morphew, 2017). The message being
broadcast was loud and it was clear, the states that chose to adopt performance-based
funding policies were on the cutting edge of higher education policy and all other states
choosing not to adopt the policies were falling behind. By coupling performance-based
funding with progressive policy suggests that policy detractors are backward, out of
touch, and interested in sustaining an older system (Davies, 2014).
Summary
This chapter has looked at the advent of performance-based funding and how the
policy tied state funds to student graduation rates in higher education. The policy, having
purse strings attached to state appropriations, mandated institutional compliance, though
there was not a roadmap to follow in order to achieve the policy’s goals. There have been
two waves of policy implementation, with the first beginning with Tennessee in 1979 and
a later wave in the 1990’s. Both waves sough to enhance oversight of decision making by
college administrators in light of declining graduation rates. The policy also had
unintended effects on the type of students who were being admitted to colleges so that
compliance could be met. This made higher education less attainable to many citizens,
but still became a blueprint for further meritocratic education policies.
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CHAPTER 4
Value-Added Models
Education policy over the past decade has shifted from emphasizing whole school
performance to also focusing on individual teachers (Goldhaber, 2015). Policy makers
had long sought to find a way to quantify the impact teachers had on students’ learning
within their classrooms. What were adopted were value-added models which are an
objective measure that does not rely on human interpretation of teacher practices
(Goldhaber, 2015). Instead, it is a system in which teachers are evaluated relative to one
another rather than relative to an absolute standard (Goldhaber, 2015). This creates a
distribution in which teachers can be ranked (Goldhaber, 2015). However, it is also a
more novel way of evaluating teachers that many in the school system, at the time of
adoption, were vastly unfamiliar with the method (Goldhaber, 2015). Yet, over the past
decade, merit pay and value-added models for teacher evaluations have become
important topics within many states and school districts in the last decade. Even though
these models became popular, they were not without their critics. It is because of this that
by only comparing average test scores, we have a very narrow understanding about the
teacher and school’s performance.
In this chapter I will examine federal policies under the space race that set the
stage for federal involvement in state education curricula and accountability measures. I
will then look at current teacher evaluation systems and how they have incorporated
value-added models. Next, I will focus specifically on the adoption of value-added
models by states and what economic principles led to policy adoption. From this point, I
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will explore what set the stage for the proliferation of value-added policies, including
prior federally mandated policies. Next, I will consider how student test scores affect
teacher evaluations, which led to the expansion of value-added models. I will end the
chapter with previous studies that have been conducted using value-added principles and
teacher performance.
Space Race, the beginning of federally funded curriculum changes
Prior to the proliferation of the report “A Nation at Risk” and accountability
measures such as value-added models, Congress in 1958 passed the National Defense
Education Act. With its passing, the National Science Foundation began pouring money
into curriculum development in K-12 schools (Hoff, 2020). This was to ensure our
competitiveness of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) type
careers and to ensure science and math curricula were at the forefront of American
education. The National Science Foundation, in total, spent $500 million on curricula and
teacher development (Hoff, 2020). In the mid 1970’s, there were federally funded
curricula programs totaling fifteen for elementary schools, twelve for middle schools, and
thirty-four for high schools (Hoff, 2020). The cross-content materials were meant to
engage student and bridge subjects. For example, within the high school biology
curriculum, there was a series of films, including ones on viruses, ecology, and social
biology (Hoff, 2020).
Through the use of federal funds, the National Science Foundation had the goal of
teaching the basic principles found in math and science through a hands-on approach and
the notion of “learning by doing” (Hoff, 2020). It was solidifying the math and science
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base, that the knowledge could be applied in the future through a variety of STEM
careers (Review of Recommendations for NSF Project Management Reform, 2017).
This resulted in changes in the fundamentals seen in K-12. Students in K-6 started
learning about sets and number theories based on groups other than 10 (Wooten, 1965).
Additionally, high school students learning about physics now studied how waves travel
in detailed and intricate experiments such as using tidal pools (Atkin, 1980).
Some materials developed such as those created and introduced by NASA
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) scientists were well-received at schools
and widely used with the remnants still being found in classrooms today (Blake and
Della-Piana, 2001). Other materials, like “New Math” introduced in the 1960s, along
with a 5th grade anthropology program called Man: A Course of Study, fell flat and
eventually led to Congress’ restriction of the National Science Foundation curriculum in
the 1970’s (Review of Recommendations for NSF Project Management Reform, 2017).
What the National Science Foundation demonstrated was that the federal
government can use grants to entice schools to adopt curricula (Review of
Recommendations for NSF Project Management Reform, 2017). It is by tying federal
funds to initiatives that states can become coerced into policy adoption that may or may
not be beneficial. When considering the National Science Foundation funds, principles
established by being at the top in the space race would be achieved because the education
system set the groundwork in K-12. This groundwork served to develop students who
were already exposed to STEM principles and could therefore further develop
technologies needed to “win” the race at an accelerated pace.
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The grants which drove this change, though they have changed in name, still exist
in today’s educational system. They are now known as Curriculum Innovation Proposals
(CIP) and have diffused up to higher education. Curriculum Innovation Proposals are
designed to support new, innovation curriculum development and the development of
STEM higher education in areas bolstered by NASA (Curriculum development grants,
2020). The grants look favorably upon proposals of STEM curriculum that can be shared
with other schools. Further, curriculum development is required to be in alignment with
one of the following four NASA Mission Directorates: Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, Science Mission
Directorate, and Space Technologies Directorate (Curriculum development grants, 2020).
These grants were the first to set the stage for further federal involvement in
setting state educational curricula. By tying federal funds to wanted educational changes,
we saw state level compliance with federal directives. The federal government quickly
learned that by incentivizing wanted policy changes, it was able to coerce compliance.
Teacher Evaluation Systems
In the last decade there have been significant shifts to teacher evaluation policies
across the nation, and in most states the evaluation of teaching is no longer conducted just
by school administrators (Berry and Byrd, 2019). Recent federal policies, particularly
those promoted under Race to the Top, have promoted more classroom observations by
trained reviewers as well as the use of student test score data in judging individual
teachers (Berry and Byrd, 2019). However, the Education Commission of States has
recently pointed out that states, districts, and schools often struggle to create, and further,
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to implement the type of evaluation system that meaningfully differentiates teacher
performance, and provide teachers with opportunities for specific support and
development (Olcott, 2022).
Value-added models are intended to be an objective measure that looks at the
amount of “value” that a teacher “adds” to, or in some cases detracts from, student
learning and achievement from one school year to the next (Beardsley and Holloway,
2019). Value-added models are a statistical tool meant to measure the observable
relationship between a teacher’s instruction and how that instruction aides in the student’s
learning and achievement over time (Beardley and Holloway, 2019). This is done by
measuring growth in achievement from one year in comparison to the next using student
large-scale test scores, while controlling for students prior testing histories (Beardley and
Holloway, 2019). Additionally, it controls for student-level demographics (such as race,
poverty, English language proficiency, special education status), other student-level
variables (such as attendance, suspension, retention), and other variables such as class
size, average prior achievement (Beardley and Holloway, 2019).
Theoretically, policymakers design state and local tests to assess specific content
that standards deem important (Papay, 2011). Most would hope that student progress on
one achievement tested in one domain would equate to progress on additional tests. In
other words, students deemed excellent readers on one test should also do well on another
test within the same reading domain (Papay, 2011). Additionally, if a school district
wanted to reward teachers based on their ability to improve their students’ reading scores,
those within the district would have the understanding that the best teachers would raise
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student scores not only on the state test, but also on additional reading assessments as
well (Papay, 2011). Should there be conflicting scores from two similar tests, this would
raise important questions about the validity of any teacher effectiveness estimates (Papay,
2011). The gains of achievement, needed to show student growth under the models, were
measured through “high stakes testing” a cumulative standardized test given at the end of
each school year beginning in third grade (Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Summary, 2004).
Student learning is the primary goal of any school, and value-added scores are
deemed the most logical, cost-effective method for identifying teachers’ contribution to
learning (Gordon et al., 2006). Studies have found that overall teacher effects explained
11% of the variation in student test score gains (Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges,
2004).
With looming teacher shortages, states also needed to devise a plan to attract new
teacher talent, while retaining exemplary teachers already within their system.
Incentivization programs housed within value-added models would reward teachers for
improved student test scores and serve to attract, as well as retain, high quality teachers.
Studies have shown that the design of contracts, in this case teacher contracts, can have
important effects on who opts to work in specific careers. Evidence from the private
sector suggests that the choice of pay structure can affect both the productivity of
individuals in their job and who opts to pursue employment at the establishment (Lazear
and Shaw, 2007). The main idea that is more productive individuals may be more likely
to enter and remain in a profession that rewards their talents, and less productive
employees would be more likely to leave. Contrarily, if people are not rewarded for their
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output of talents in a profession, then it would reason that the more talented people would
be expected to leave if their talents are rewarded more elsewhere (Goldhaber, 2015).
Value-added models are also associated with long-term schooling with the focus
being on student performance that would translate to increased numbers of students
continuing on to higher education. This would also benefit employees in potential
earnings, as well as nonacademic outcomes such as reduction in teen pregnancy (Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff, 2014).
When considering economics-based principles, there seems to be a dominant view
that complicated matters, like education, can be understood in both quantifiable and
measurably objective ways (Beardsley and Holloway, 2019). Teachers and teacher
quality are being seen in terms of a “production function model” where teachers produce
a product that is taken in or “consumed” by students and is therefore measurable in terms
of how much “value” a teacher “adds” to the production (Beardsley and Holloway,
2019). Given this new formulation, and the position of education based in economics,
that society is made up of individuals that will make rational decisions given the right
conditions, teachers are in a position as people who make good or bad decisions that
result in adding or detracting value from student learning (Lazear, 1999).
Florida was the first state to adopt a value-added-based performance plan and
implement the program in its counties through the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Additionally,
Oklahoma and Colorado have both recently adopted pay-for-performance plans that
include a value-added component; 16 other states have voluntary implemented districtinitiated programs (Hill, Kapitula, and Umland, 2011). This creates an atmosphere that
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easily allows for states to adopt a policy of value-added models based on student
achievement on standardized tests (Hill, Kapitula, and Umland, 2011). According to
Also, by 2008, eight states used systems that based teacher pay in part on performance;
however, not all schools in these states participated in these plans (Ballotpedia, 2019).
Furthering these diffusion of accountability measures, Race to the Top was
implemented in 2010 and encouraged states to adopt value-added models for teachers
with a total of 4.3 billion dollars in incentives should states comply with the mandate
(Teacher Merit Pay, 2019). In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated that
merit pay, as a part of teacher accountability under value-added models, was the U.S.
Department of Education’s “highest priority” (Teacher Merit Pay, 2019). In the plan,
value-added models would hold teachers responsible for student testing outcomes and
reward teacher success, which is quantified by student gains on standardized tests,
through merit pay initiatives. These measures were due, in part, to the Great Recession
and states needing to defray costs as much as possible (Paige et al., 2019). As of today,
44 states (88%) have adopted and have at least begun implementing value-added models
to evaluate and, in many cases, make important decisions about teachers. This decision
can include items such as teacher tenure, merit pay, as well as teacher termination should
they not meet the minimum student growth requirements (Beardsley and Holloway,
2019).
Additional Policies that Lead to Value Added Models
Over the last two decades, new education policies have shaped our public schools.
These policies, which target student achievement gaps, are designed to ensure that all
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students are given equal opportunity to learn and that classroom teachers are held
responsible directly for those outcomes regardless of outlying factors. The policies,
which are supposed to streamline student objectives, are broken down by grade year and
subject. For a student to show mastery and a teacher to demonstrate success, students
need to achieve proficiency on the set objectives through various forms of high-stakes
testing.
In the following section, I will provide an overview of three distinct policies: No
Child Left Behind under the Bush Administration, the Teacher Incentive Fund, and Race
to the Top under the Obama Administration. All three built upon one another and created
the system of value-added model used for teacher evaluations that we currently see.
A key component of the No Child Left Behind policy is high-stakes testing.
Though No Child Left Behind was enacted in 2002, the stage was being set in the mid
1990’s. At that time, the testing industry began to experience a shift towards standards
based high-stakes assessment as a necessary component of standards-based reforms
(Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). The shift from test publishers’ proprietary products to
various versions of state-owned tests began and test publishers found themselves in the
position of developing content, manufacturing tests, and scoring and reporting on
assessments that were not originally part of their inventory (Jorgensen and Hoffman,
2003). Further, from 1994 to 2000, most states had instituted content standards that
students should achieve throughout the year based on grade level. Performance standards,
collection of longitudinal data, and use of secure test forms each year were used to track
student achievement and inform instruction. Schools also recognized the importance of
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quick test results reporting and thus by the end of the 1990s, states had become well
informed about the design and implementation of large-scale assessment programs
(Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003).
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). New mandates centered around
accountability, local control, parental involvement, and funding (Jorgensen and Hoffman,
2003). If children are not learning, based on standardized test results, the law requires
that the school find out why. If the schools are not meeting standards, options for
improvement and help will be made available by the U.S. Department of Education
(Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). It was also required that schools must ensure that all
students learn the essential skills and knowledge defined by the state using grade-level
standards and benchmarks (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). No Child Left Behind
requires that states have assessment systems that track the achievement of all students
against a common set instructional standards that are implemented throughout the state
(Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003).
Further, states were required to assess third- through eighth-grade students
annually in both the subjects of reading and mathematics of which the tests must be based
on state standards that are challenging to the students and can therefore show mastery and
growth (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). The results of the standardized tests and
subsequently, school grades, were made public so that anyone within the public can track
the performance of any school in the US (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003). Improvement
among lower socio-economic children must be demonstrated under the Adequate Yearly
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Progress provisions detailed within No Child Left Behind (Jorgensen and Hoffman,
2003).
Lastly, schools unable to demonstrate adequate progress will be provided with
assistance from the state and federal government and may be subject to possible
corrective action should they still not demonstrate growth (Jorgensen and Hoffman,
2003). All states requesting federal funds will be required to submit plans that describe
their achievement standards, aligned assessments, reporting procedures, and
accountability systems (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003).
In exchange for greater accountability on the part of the states, the No Child Left
Behind regulations would provide states with flexibility and control over how they use
federal funds distributed as part of No Child Left Behind (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003).
Schools, however, would be encouraged to use funds towards teacher retention,
professional development, and technology training as they see best suited. States would
also be given greater flexibility and control over their programs for English language
learners (Jorgensen and Hoffman, 2003).
Schools that failed to make adequate yearly progress for two consecutive years
were identified for “school improvement” (NCLB, New America, 2021). Schools were
then required to draft an improvement plan which devoted at least 10 percent of federal
funds provided under Title I to teacher professional development (NCLB and funding
controversy, 2021). Further, No Child Left Behind required that school districts spend up
to 20 percent of their federal Title I funds to provide immediate assistance to children
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attending schools identified as in need of improvement, through either public school
choice or supplemental educational services (NCLB and funding controversy, 2021).
No Child Left Behind created much controversy on how to implement its farreaching policies and was deemed an “underfunded mandate”; however, states were not
required to participate (NCLB and funding controversy, 2021). All requirements were a
condition of federal funds that would be disbursed to the states through a block grant that
was a component of No Child Left Behind. While a state may not be able to provide all
recommended curricula without federal education funding, it could choose to opt out of
No Child Left Behind and the requirements it included (NCLB and funding controversy,
2021). The law’s requirements only applied to those states that voluntarily elected to
participate.
When No Child Left Behind was passed, the Department of Education assured
states that federal funding would cover a significant portion of the costs associated with
the law’s new requirements (NCLB and funding controversy, 2021). However, the costs
of test administration, data collection, and school improvement reforms had been
understated, and thus states argued that the federal government did not adequately
support the reforms. It has been found that the estimate of additional expenditure needed
to implement No Child Left Behind that was provided by the Government Accountability
Office vastly underestimated. A Government Accountability Office report vastly
underestimated the additional implementation expenditures states would see from 20022008, which varied depending on the type of test states used (NCLB and funding
controversy, 2021).
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States that implemented No Child Left Behind policies feared teachers would
forego traditional teaching methods and begin to teach directly to the test standards in
order to achieve the mandated gains. In a study conducted by Dee and Jacob (2010), it
was found that in states where the exam results were used to hold teachers accountable,
instruction was reported to have shifted to testing criteria which left out socio-emotional
learning and resulted in behavioral problems on the part of the students (Dee and Jacob,
2010).
After seeing little to no improvement in student achievement, Congress began a
new initiative to incentivize teachers and have better staff buy-in when it came to highstakes results, especially in lower socio-economic areas where it was believed the largest
student gains could be made. As a result, in 2006, Congress created the Teacher Incentive
Fund as a means of supporting performance-based compensation for teachers and
principals in high-needs schools (Evaluation of the teacher incentive fund, 2021). Grants
totaling $1.8 billion were sent to school districts that were willing to implement the four
program components: measures of teacher/principal effectiveness involving student
achievement gains; pay-for-performance bonuses; additional pay opportunities for extra
responsibilities; and professional development aiming to improve performance
(Evaluation of the teacher incentive fund, 2021).
The Teacher Incentive Fund program provides funding for projects that develop
and implement performance-based teacher and principal initiatives (National Center for
Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance: Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive
Fund, 2021). Performance-based compensation systems must demonstrate gains in
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student academic achievement, as well as have classroom evaluations conducted multiple
times throughout each school year and provides educators with incentives to take on
additional responsibilities and leadership roles (National Center for Education Evaluation
and Regional Assistance: Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund, 2021). The purpose
of the program is to support the use of performance-based compensation for teachers, as
well as to utilize other human capital strategies that enhance the status quo in an attempt
to increase students’ access to effective and highly-effective educators in lower socioeconomic schools (National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance:
Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund, 2021).
Recipients of these federal funds use them to develop and fund teacher leadership
positions and incentivize teachers to teach in lower socio-economic schools (National
Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance: Evaluation of the Teacher
Incentive Fund, 2021). Projects that have been funded include: teacher career pathway
programs that serve to diversify roles for teachers; teacher career pathways that
recognize, develop, and reward excellent teaching; incentives for effective teachers who
take on leadership roles within their schools; incentives that attract, support, reward, and
retain the most effective teachers and administrators at high-need, target schools;
rigorous, ongoing professional development training for teacher and principals,
leadership roles for teachers specifically at school turnaround; and the creation of new
salary structures based on teacher effectiveness (Teacher incentive fund, 2021).
A four-year study looked at the impacts of the Teacher Incentive Fund and
bonuses to pay. The study measured the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part
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of a comprehensive compensation system. The schools examined were to fully implement
their performance-based compensation system. Control schools were to implement the
same performance-based compensation system with one exceptional: pay-forperformance bonus component was replaced with a one percent bonus paid to all
educators regardless of performance (National Center for Education Evaluation and
Regional Assistance: Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund, 2021). Schools that were
studied were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. The report provided
implementation and impact information and found that implementation was similar
across the four years, with most districts implementing at least 3 of the 4 required
components for teachers (National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional
Assistance: Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund, 2021). In a subset of 10 districts
participating in the random assignment study, educators’ understanding of performance
measures did in fact improve over time, with many teachers being unaware that they were
eligible for a bonus. Further, their understanding did not improve after the second year of
implementation. Teachers were found to also underestimate the maximum amount they
could earn. The teacher incentive fund and pay-for-performance bonus policy ultimately
was found to have small, positive impacts on students’ reading and math achievement
(National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance: Evaluation of the
Teacher Incentive Fund, 2021).
Broadening the impact of the Teacher Incentive Fund, the Obama administration
introduced Race to the Top legislation in 2009. It is a competitive fund designed to
promote school improvement on both a state and local school district level (What is race
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to the top and how will it benefit public schools?, 2021). At its advent, $4.35 billion was
pledged in what was deemed the “largest ever federal investment in education reform”
(What is race to the top and how will it benefit public schools?, page 11, 2021). State
governments were asked to submit plans for education reform in order to be granted a
portion of the funding set aside for the program (What is race to the top and how will it
benefit public schools?, 2021).
In its press release, the White House laid out four key areas for reform in order to
qualify for Race to the Top funding. These areas included, an improvement of
assessments and more rigorous standards for schools, the turn-around of failing schools
through increased emphasis and resources, increased support that allows teachers and
staff to be more effective, and better methods for tracking progress of both students and
teachers (i.e., value-added models).
Each state was given the opportunity to submit a plan directly to the U.S.
Department of Education. In the end, 46 of 50 states submitted plans, though not all were
accepted, but many states have received funding from the program to complete the
initiative (What is race to the top and how will it benefit public schools?, 2021).
However, regardless of the acceptance of a state’s plans, all states experienced a surge in
the adoption of various education policies (Howell et al., 2020). Further, it was found that
this surge was not an extension of past policy trends. Legislators from all states involved
reported that Race to the Top directly affected policy deliberations within their states
(Howell et al., 2020). The patterns of the policy adoptions along with legislator responses
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corresponded with states’ experiences in the Race to the Top competitions (McGuinn,
2012).
President Obama fashioned Race to the Top as a coercive measure aimed at statelevel policymaking that aligned with his education objectives on college readiness, which
was the ultimate goal of the policy (McGuinn, 2012). The legislation created new data
systems, ways to track teacher effectiveness, and attempted to specifically target lowperforming schools. Obama intended to incentivize excellence and stimulate reform and
launch a race to the top in America’s public schools (Howell et al., 2020).
Race to the Top was comprised of three phases of the competition. Phase 1 and
Phase 2 included specific education-policy priorities on which each applicant would be
specifically evaluated; states were asked to describe their current education status and
then outline their future goals in meeting the four criteria in each of these categories.
State applicants were scored across six categories that assessed the potential for a state’s
proposed policy changes would accomplish the goals of Race to the Top (Howell et al.,
2020).
Further, to assist states in writing their applications, they were offered technical
assistance workshops, webinars, and training materials (McGuinn, 2012). In addition to
the workshops, organizations such as the National Council on Teacher Quality were
asked to publish reports intended to help states maximize their likelihood of winning an
award (McGuinn, 2012).
In all, 40 states submitted applications to Phase 1 of the competition (Howell et
al., 2020) and both states’ past accomplishments and their stated commitments to adopt
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new policies informed the scores they received and hence their chances of winning
federal funding (Howell et al., 2020). Finalists and winners were announced in March
2010, with phase 1 winners being Tennessee and Delaware. The two states were
subsequently awarded roughly $500 million and $120 million, respectively, which
amounted to 10 percent and 5.7 percent of the two respective states budgets for K‒12
education for a single year (Howell et al., 2020). Thirty-five states submitted applications
during Phase 2 of the competition which took place in June 2010. Nine winners who
included Florida, New York, Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Hawaii, and Rhode Island were each awarded prizes between $75 million and $700
million in Phase 2 (Howell et al., 2020).
After phase 2 the funds set aside for the competition had been depleted. At the
behest of the president, Congress allotted funds to support a third phase. A higher
percentage of participating states won in Phase 3; however, the amounts of these grants
were considerably smaller and ranged from $17 million to $43 million (Howell et al.,
2020).
States that were awarded grants under Race to the Top were subject to a
monitoring process that consisted of annual performance reports, accountability
protocols, and actual site visits (Howell et al., 2020). After receiving an award letter, a
state could immediately withdraw up to 12.5 percent of its overall award (Howell et al.,
2020). The remaining balance of funds were only available to states after they received
and approved by the state’s participating local education agencies, at which point a state’s
drawdown of funds depended upon its ability to meet the specific goals and timelines
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outlined (Howell et al., 2020). Like No Child Left Behind, Race to the Top was focused
on only two learning outcomes, math and reading, which leaves all the social sciences
(including economics, history, and the arts) and all of the sciences in the background
(Onosko, 2011).
Further, under Race to the Top, as much as 50% of teachers’ yearly evaluations is
based on student test scores in math and language arts under value-added models
(Onosko, 2011). Teachers who fail to improve student test scores at the projected rate for
three consecutive years can then be fired or transferred from their position. Further,
underperforming schools over a three-year period will see their administrators removed
as well (Onosko, 2011).
A report conducted in 2016 by the Institute for Education Science (the research
branch of the US Department of Education), looked at the effectiveness of the Race to the
Top initiative. It was found that differences in student achievement between Race to the
Top states and other states may be due to other factors and not the program (Klein, 2016).
Race to the Top states differed from other states before receiving the grants, in additional
to other reforms which may also have affected student achievement (Klein, 2016).
In the end, the report concluded, it is difficult to discern whether Race to the Top
had any long-term impacts on state policy (Klein, 2016). There were differences between
states that got the grants and those that did not, however, other factors could explain
those differences since some states were already implementing policies outlined by Race
to the Top even before the grants were given out (Klein, 2016).
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What was found was that the original Race to the Top states were more likely to
adopt policies and practices encouraged by the program such as rigorous standards and
tests. This creates conditions for charter school success, and improving educator
effectiveness (Klein, 2016). However, there were not significant differences between
states that got the grants and those that did not receive awards when it came to creating
data systems to measure student achievement and build state capacity (Klein, 2016). The
major finding to note, was that states that got the smaller grants were more likely than
non-Race to the Top states to adopt the program’s policies in one area: teacher
effectiveness in the form of value-added models (Klein, 2016).
With little gains in student achievement having been attained, it is surprising that
protocols developed under Race to the Tops are still prevalent within our schools two
presidential administrations later. In Catching Up or Leading the Way: American
Education in the Age of Globalization, Zhao (2009) argues that America is at a
crossroads and warns against the nationalization of education. Zhao (2009) expresses it
will undermine the diversity of thought, creativity, individual talent, and expertise that
previously made the American education system unique. Zhao (2009) further warns
against a national reform agenda focused on test scores in only two subject areas
(Language Arts and Math) and recommends a return to the tradition of local control. He
states it will provide more diverse talents in students, rather than standardized laborers;
more individuals with creative skills rather than good test-takers; and more individuals
who will become entrepreneurs rather than simple, obedient employees (Zhao, 2009).
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Assessments of Value-Added Models
Value-added models use student growth scores compiled at the teacher or
classroom level to yield teacher-level value-added estimates (Paige et al., 2019). Under
these new evaluation systems, potential teachers who believe they will be effective and
rewarded for their effectiveness are more likely to see teaching as a desirable profession
since there is now a monetary incentive (Goldhaber, 2015). Traditionally, teaching has
been a very predictable occupation when it comes to pay and job security (Goldhaber,
2015). The use of value added represents a significant departure from this regime, and the
increased risks associated with teaching could result in teaching being perceived as a less
desirable occupation if the overall compensation level does not rise enough to offset
perceived job security risks (Goldhaber, 2015).
Another point of contention is how to construct groups: whether teachers should
be compared to others in the district, others in the same school, others in the same grade
within school, or some combination of the above (Hill et al., 2011). In practice, however,
it is hard to effectively isolate the effects of school, teacher, and grade (McCaffrey et al.,
2003).
A number of concerns have arisen about using value-added models for teacher
evaluation and accountability purposes include methodological concerns such as
reliability, validity, bias; logistical concerns such fairness, transparency, usability; and
consequential concerns such as high-stakes testing attached to outcomes, and effects at
the school level such as culture (Beardsley and Holloway, 2019). Recent research has
found that teacher value-added scores frequently vary based on the specific student
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assessment tool and the subtests used in constructing these tools (Lockwood, McCaffrey,
Hamilton, et al., 2007). Hill et al. (2011) was critical of a reliance of test scores only. In
their study, Hill et al. (2011) demonstrated that value-added scores do show convergent
and, to a lesser degree, discriminant validity, since other scores carry a “signal” about the
quality of classroom instruction and thus may be valuable and relatively inexpensive
tools. Because of this, it is suggested that districts use value-added scores in combination
with high-quality, discriminating observational systems or as a trigger for such
observational systems. Hill et al. (2011) concluded that value-added scores alone are not
enough to identify teachers for reward, remediation, or termination and further suggested
that high value-added teachers did not necessarily have the best instruction. The data
further suggested that teachers who should be the target of “remediation-type”
interventions, would not be identified by value-added scores (Hill et al., 2011).
Most states, however, have chosen to adopt value-added models. This is due to
purported positives that can come from the models such as information about teacher
effectiveness could lead to direct action in terms of the type of professional development
that teachers receive (Goldhaber, 2015). The identification of which teachers are effective
might also encourage informal learning opportunities (Goldhaber, 2015). Hanushek
(2009), for example, estimates that annually dismissing 5% to 10% of the least effective
teachers in each school and replacing them with teachers of “average” effectiveness will
boost the test performance of US students by about 50% of a standard deviation.
If prospective teachers and school districts have been informed about what makes
for an effective teacher from the outset, the benefits of value-added models will rise.
68

Contrarily, if the models create disruptive effects in schools, such as mass teacher
departures, or if value-added measures are not accurate enough to reflect true teacher
contributions, the policies could harm student achievement (Goldhaber, 2015). A recent
study (Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2012) shows there is a “disruptive effect” of teacher
turnover. Additionally, it was found that attending a school where there is high teacher
turnover appears to have a negative effect on student test scores in both math and English
language arts (Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2012).
With a system of value-added models becoming increasingly widespread there
should be additional research regarding the positive effect of these models on student
performance. This, however, is not the case. What studies have found, including one
conducted by RAND in New York City, is that three major components have not been
met: Merit pay did not improve student achievement at any grade level, it did not affect
teachers reported attitudes, perceptions, or behaviors, and many teachers reported that
while the bonus was desirable, the program did not change their teaching practices
(Evaluating the Effectiveness of Teacher Pay-for-Performance, 2019). What researchers
did find was that merit pay tied to high stakes tests produced high teacher turnover, a
growing number of inexperienced teachers filling classrooms, and more teaching to the
test (McMurray, 2019). Additionally, it should not be assumed that a value-added score is
a sign of teacher quality or effectiveness because these scores also represent a bias due to
student selection, the effect of other resources on student achievement, and some
measurement error (Amour-Garb, 2009).
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To further ensure the best teachers are in the classrooms, credentials developed by
each state attempt to ensure quality instruction by requiring teachers to obtain certain
types of preparation prior to entering the classroom or, in some cases, to have certain
characteristics such as on-the-job experience (Amour-Garb, 2009). Contrarily,
performance measures should be based on observations of a teacher’s instruction within
the classroom by supervisors, peers, and/or external evaluators (Amour-Garb, 2009).
However, it has been found that value-added models are reliable within groups
such as the same school or district (Paige et al., 2019). In these circumstances, valueadded estimates of teacher effectiveness are mostly consistent from one year to the next,
regardless of the type of students and subject areas (Paige et al., 2019). When
considering value-added models, researchers have found that five issues need to be
addressed: reliability, validity, bias, transparency, and fairness (Amrein-Beardsley et al.,
2016). Reliability looks at how teachers are classified as effective one year and yet might
be classified as ineffective the next, or vice versa (Paige et al., 2019). Given the stability
of teachers’ levels of effectiveness, these swings should not be seen within the data.
Research has documented serious concerns when considering the reliability of valueadded models. Teachers classified as effective one year might have a 25–59% chance of
being classified as “ineffective” the next year, or vice versa (Paige et al., 2019).
Validity is the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of
test scores (Paige et al., 2019). It is found that there is no evidence that teacher valueadded models are correlated with at least one other concurrent measure of teacher
effectiveness (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016), such as a supervisor’s observational
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assessment or student survey-based assessment. Bias pertains to the validity of the
inferences that stakeholders make from test-based scores (Paige et al., 2019). When it
comes to bias, evidence suggests that teacher value-added estimates systematically differ
because of the varying demographic characteristics of students nonrandomly assigned to
their classrooms (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016). Because schools do not randomly
assign teachers to grades, these variables are not controlled in order to mitigate bias
(Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016).
Transparency is defined as the extent to which something is both accessible and
easily understandable (Paige et al., 2019). Previous research has found that teachers and
administrators do not seem to comprehend the models being used to evaluate them, which
would erode the extent to which they might use their value-added estimates to improve
instruction or initiate reforms (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016).
Fairness is the impartiality of the way test scores are interpreted (Paige et al.,
2019). Value-added models are, for the most part, only applicable to teachers who
instruct in areas that are subjected to standardized tests (Paige et al., 2019). Current
research suggests that predominantly it is teachers of math, reading, and language arts
who are being held accountable using these systems. This leaves about 70% of all publicschool teachers that are not counted and puts the weight of responsibility for both school
and individual student achievement on the shoulder of only 30% of all teachers (AmreinBeardsley et al., 2016). The ineligible teachers typically teach children in early childhood
and high school grades as well as in “noncore” subject areas including social studies,
science, art, music, and physical education (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016).
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In a study conducted in a California school district, after having applied an
economic-based analytical framework to a set of data, Hanushek (1970) argued that years
of experience and education were not related to higher student achievement. Further,
teacher effects did not explain Mexican American students’ achievement of outcomes,
and teacher effects did have any impact on White students’ achievement outcomes,
regardless of the student’s socioeconomic status (Hanushek, 1970). Hanushek (1979),
bolstered by the findings, called for additional “econometric instruments” to develop a
model that could measure the amount of “value” that a teacher added or took away from
student learning.
In addition, in his 2011 study, Papay found that using different achievement tests
produces substantially different estimates of individual teacher effectiveness. The
variation in teacher value-added estimates that is found from using different outcomes
exceeded the variation that was introduced by implementing different model
specifications (Papay, 2011). Although the tests can vary in their content, item format,
scaling, and sample of students, none of these factors appear to explain the differences in
teacher effects (Papay, 2011). The results he found suggested that test timing and
inconsistency, like measurement error, play a much greater role (Papay, 2011).
Particularly interesting was the finding that the timing of the test alone may produce
substantial variation in teacher productivity estimates across outcome measures (Papay,
2011). This raises important questions for teacher accountability policies. Other choices
about model specification depend on how districts plan to use these estimates. For
example, some models automatically take a teacher’s estimated effect, which is
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essentially using the teacher’s estimated stability of teacher value-added estimates as a
“fixed effect” (Papay, 2011). Other models “shrink” teacher estimates back toward the
mean, with the amount of reduction depending on the available information concerning
teacher performance incuding the sample size and variability of student test scores
(Papay, 2011). Within these models used to examine accumulated teacher effectiveness,
extreme results can occur both from true differences in teacher performance and from
sampling variation (Papay, 2011).
In addition to these issues, research suggests that three years of teacher-level data
are needed to make the most accurate value-added estimates (Amrein-Beardsley et al.,
2016). Further, some states’ tenure and due process laws allow districts to terminate or
untenure teachers with only one or two consecutively unsatisfactory value-added scores
(Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016).
In addition, teachers of gifted students often have lower ratings because highachieving kids test high on standardized tests and often make smaller gains (Duffrin,
2011). Eric Hanushek, of Stanford University, supports the use of value-added measures
for formal evaluation, although he concluded that the scores do not show enough
differences among most teachers who fall in the middle range (Duffrin, 2011).
This creates a system where teachers are concerned for their value-added scores
and could choose careers at schools that would provide the best advantage for achieving
the needed scores. Because of this, within our current education system, there is little
dispute that disadvantaged students are more likely to have the least qualified teachers
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2006). Schools with higher socio-economic status tend to
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attract a higher caliber of teachers since they routinely turn out students who achieve
higher scores on high stakes tests. This creates a cyclical system where teachers who
want to achieve highly effective status on their value-added models and are rewarded
with tenure, will work at schools where this goal is easier to achieve and does not put
their livelihood at risk. This results in schools in lower socio-economic areas having
lower ranking teachers according to our current evaluation system.
The performance measure used in value-added models needs to give teachers
accurate information about their productivity (Brehm et al., 2017). Given that schools
have small class sizes and there is a need to base performance pay on one year of testing
outcomes, it may not be feasible to obtain precise enough value-added estimates in
combination with individual incentives to impact teacher effort, including student
achievement (Brehm et al., 2017). Further, it was found that teachers are unresponsive to
many incentives since in many cases, they may already be putting forth a maximum
amount of effort, or they may not know how to increase student achievement (Brehm et
al., 2017). In studies conducted on teacher responses and motivation within value-added
models, there seemed to be a lot of noise within the data. Noise is defined as the random
irregularity in any real-life data. Additionally, an increase in noise reduces the odds of
winning an award given there is likely to be no change in effort for those above the
threshold.
There are clear disadvantages to working in lower socio-economic schools, some
teachers and unions have turned to the courts to combat the perceived systemic failures.
Several court cases that challenged the authority or jurisdiction of the state Department of
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Education to enact evaluation regulations or laws that use value-added models have
appeared (Paige et al., 2019).
Teachers and their unions argue that the use of value-added models leads to
teacher isolation where teachers would “close their classroom door” and revert to
working alone instead of working with their team (Paige et al., 2019). Additionally, they
argued that using of high-stakes testing causes teachers to leave the profession and avoid
high-needs schools and seek safer assignments where they can avoid the risk of low
scores (Paige et al., 2019). In the end, courts have sided with state governments and
found that there was a legitimate interest to increase student academic performance by
improving the quality of instructional, administrative, and supervisory services in the
public schools (Paige et al., 2019). This was considered the “rational basis test” (Paige et
al., 2019). While courts may uphold the use of value-added models under a rational basis
test, courts were wary regarding use of value-added models when making significant
decisions with respect to teacher employment status (Paige et al., 2019).
Given the above issues, in her essay on value-added models, Amour-Garb (2009)
suggested more plausible policy options for ensuring teacher quality which would benefit
both the teachers and students. These include the use of teacher value-added models as
one part of the teacher tenure decision and the use of overall evaluations conducted at the
school level as a complimentary piece of evidence. The use of these evaluations is one
part of the compensation decision and would give teacher value-added information to
school principals without directly attaching high stakes (Amour-Garb, 2009). Schoollevel accountability would also focus on school value-added models, but would put
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pressure on principals to improve, giving them an incentive to use teacher value-added
information in any meaningful way (Amour-Garb, 2009).
Adding to earlier information, individual value-added ratings, according to
Duffrin (2011), can be skewed by random events including student illness or a
neighborhood crisis, all of which are outside a teacher’s control. Therefore, value-added
information should be combined with other information and the understanding of people
who know what’s going on in a classroom (Duffrin, 2011).
In theory, teachers should only be assessed for student learning that occurs when
the student is within their class (Papay, 2011). Because of this, a value-added measure
would compare a student’s performance on the first day of the school year to their
performance on the very last day (Papay, 2011). However, in practice, tests rarely occur
at the very beginning or end of the school year and thus leaving a portion of one teacher’s
instruction to be attributed to another teacher, from the previous year (Papay, 2011).
Further, it is often difficult to attribute students’ learning only to one teacher. This
is due to both the mobility of the student within and across schools, and because students
often learn skills from several teachers simultaneously (Croninger and Valli, 2009). This
can be seen particularly in middle and high schools where students often have different
teachers for many of their subjects.
Finally, most value-added models use a previous year’s test score as a measure of
past performance and any learning loss or gain that occurs over the summer becomes
intertwined with value-added estimates (Papay, 2011). If a teacher’s class has a
disproportionate amount of students whose skills were lost over the summer, those
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teachers may actually demonstrate greater gains in impacts on student learning than
teachers with similar estimated effects whose class did not demonstrate learning loss
during vacation (Papay, 2011).
If value-added measures continue to be used as part of the evaluation about
teacher performance, more attention should be paid to the tests themselves (Papay, 2011).
Currently, tests are designed to measure student, not teacher, performance (Papay, 2011).
The tests are designed to identify a district’s best teachers and differ from those designed
to assess student proficiency. Further, when a test is administered must be considered
very carefully (Papay, 2011). An accountability system based on several different
assessments would provide data that can be used for both coaching and instructional
responses on all tests in that subject area (Papay, 2011). Further, while the ability to raise
student test scores is important when considering teacher quality, it represents only one of
many key factors of what makes a great teacher (Papay, 2011). Combining this test-based
accountability with other performance measures could help to address these issues
(Papay, 2011). Given the amount variation in any single assessment of value-added
models, combining multiple sources of information could provide both schools and
teachers with a better understanding of their performance (Papay, 2011).
Summary
This chapter has looked at how value-added models came into existence within
our current public education system by building on previous policies such as No Child
Left Behind, Common Core, and Race to the Top initiatives. Value-added models
directly tie teacher evaluation to student performance on end of year high-stakes tests.
77

The policy, meant to ensure accountability on the part of the classroom teacher for both
content and student retention of information, is based on an understanding that all
students begin public school on an equal footing. This chapter has discussed how that
understanding may be flawed. Value-added models were a result of federal policy and
then implemented in a rapid fashion by states. This current study will build on the
understanding of value-added models established in this chapter and look further as to
why states chose to implement the policy.
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CHAPTER 5
Innovation of Diffusion
A person cannot claim to understand policymaking without being able to explain
the process through which governments adopt policies (Berry and Berry, 2014). With this
understanding, public policy scholars have conducted extensive research into the
innovation and diffusion of policy (Berry and Berry, 2014). Most policies spread
gradually. The spread is incremental and normally found to be a product of policy
learning and emulation (Boushey, 2012). Recently, however, it has been found that a
substantial portion of innovative policies trigger a rush by states to copy a new popular
idea (Boushey, 2012), one of these being value-added models.
It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss what policy diffusion is and why it is
important for scholars to study. In the chapter I will explain the mechanisms for diffusion
such as learning, imitation, normative pressure, competition, and coercion. I will also
explain the types of regional diffusion. I will next look at how federalism plays a part in
the diffusion process by looking at federal influence. I will go on to explain how both
internal and external determinants such as problem severity, electorate attitudes, political
culture and policy coalitions influence the diffusion of a given policy. Lastly, I will
explain the general model I am testing, the federal influence on the model and the internal
determinants that I will use to help explain value-added policy adoption.
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What is Diffusion and Why it is Important
Policy diffusion is the process by which innovation of new policy spreads (Gray,
1973). The diffusion process requires contact among states or districts, a transmission
process, and acceptance of the given policy by additional states (Lave and March, 1993).
Further, policy innovation is a program that is new to the state government that is
adopting it; a specific policy can be innovative in a one state even if it is not new to the
other surrounding states (Berry and Berry, 2007). This policy diffusion process explains
the spread of an idea, product, or technique over a given period of time. Further, diffusion
contains three interrelated components: the innovation or ‘thing’ that diffuses, the adopter
(the state), and the adoption environment (the diffusion milieu) (Feller and Menzel,
1977). For this study, innovation will be defined as the first use by a given state of a new
idea, where new means only new to the adopting agent (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971).
Much attention has been focused on how variation in state political, institutional,
cultural, economic, and social characteristics allow for governments to innovate over
time (Boushey, 2012; Berry and Berry, 1990; Canon and Baum, 1981). Through this
body of research, it has been demonstrated that both political and institutional attributes
including ideology (Berry and Berry, 1990), legislative professionalism (Volden, 2006),
political competition (Karch, 2006), and in some cases, public opinion (Pacheco, 2012)
shape a government’s propensity to innovate.
Yet, further research has sought to identify the role of “carriers” in the diffusion
of innovations and demonstrate how professional organizations (Boushey, 2012; Balla;
2001; Gray, 1973), interest groups (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998), and policy
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entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 1997) all work to collaborate amongst state governments to
target policy change and effectively show policy lessons through their own successes and
failures which diffuse across state lines.
When thinking of diffusion models, we usually think of a set of governmental
jurisdictions (e.g., the fifty states in the United States) as a social system and maintain
that the pattern of policy adoptions by member governments results from one member
emulating the behavior of another member (Berry and Berry, 2014). In the most general
sense, the probability of adoption of a policy by one governmental jurisdiction is
influenced by the policy choices of other governments in the system (Berry and Berry,
2014).
As a property of the adopting organization, the behavior indicates innovativeness
as a part of the diffusing idea and further indicates adoptability. This demonstrates that if
a state adopts a new policy relatively quickly and extensively, the action alone provides
evidence both that the state is innovative, and that the idea is adoptable (Down and Mohr,
1979). Diffusion represents a process of quick adoption, which imitates and mimics
policy learning (Foucault and Montpetit, 2011). The demand to adopt new policies by
policy makers creates an environment that encourages the replication of peer experiences
with new ideas, based on anticipated payoffs (Boushey, 2012).
Innovation is a process that occurs in two stages (Zaltman et al., 1973). The first
is the diffusion stage, this stops when a prospective adopter may have heard about the
innovation and how it might be of benefit to the organization (Zaltman et al., 1973). The
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second stage is the adoption stage. This starts at the point of awareness and continues
until a decision about adoption has been reached (Zaltman et al., 1973).
Once the potential innovator becomes aware of the “new” policy and chooses to
adopt, Feller and Menzel (1977) describe the next steps which are the pattern of
organizational innovativeness. They explain diffusion as a source of discrete and
continuous alterations in relation to a specific set of adopters (Feller and Menzel, 1977).
Further, the diffusion contains external determinants to the organization which pressure
the organization to alter its existing policy practice. These define the range of feasible
alternatives to the current policies. It also looks at which conditions for which
information flows and evaluates the performance characteristics of the proposed
innovation. These social environmental components are then filtered through the internal
decision-making process of the organization to produce a decision to accept or reject the
innovation (Feller and Menzel, 1977).
Feller and Menzel (1977) suggest that these differences affect the rate of adoption
of specific techniques, the significance of other factors that influence diffusion patterns
across a set of potential adopters, and the likelihood that there will be any systematic
pattern of organizational innovativeness. Further, this pattern of organization creates a
chain of events that can cause disruption throughout the adoption cycle. This is due to the
chain having broken or missing links that can completely block or lengthen the policy
diffusion process (Feller and Menzel, 1977).
The innovation-decision design combats the effects of interaction by bringing
interacting variables together in the same equation (Winter, 1968). In terms of decision82

making elements or choice as opposed to state organizational variables, the determinants
for adoption are contingent upon the effect that decentralization has on innovation (Down
and Mohr, 1979). The decision to innovate also depends on the amount of agreement on
values and information that exists among state decision makers. If decision makers share
the same ideals and are all well-informed, then there should be innovation of policies
between states (Kaufman, 1960). Additionally, state wealth or slack will play an outsized
role in a state’s calculations surrounding the potential adoption of an innovation (Down
and Mohr, 1979).
Further, the properties of innovations, such as, compatibility and relative
advantage, cannot be measured or their impact assessed without first referencing the state
that is potentially implementing the policy. It is because of this that any model that tries
to anticipate the extent and time of adoption must be sure to include both characteristics
of the state and the innovation in the context surrounding a particular decision (Down and
Mohr, 1979).
When considering the variables for policy diffusion and adoption, we need to
consider why a particular variable is expected to be related to innovativeness. This can
help to reveal a greater level of generality and abstraction (Down and Mohr, 1979).
Predictors need to be framed to be broadly applicable, which will cut down on instability
within the models (Down and Mohr, 1979).
Mechanisms for Diffusion
Recent literature has identified a variety of alternative mechanisms by which the
policy choices from one jurisdiction can influence the choices of other governments. At
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least five mechanisms have been discerned: learning, imitation, normative pressure,
competition, and coercion (Berry and Berry, 2014).
Learning occurs when policymakers in one jurisdiction (or state) derive
information about the effectiveness (or success) of a policy from previously adopting
governments (Levy, 1994). Success can be defined not only in meeting policy objectives
set forth, but also in achieving personal political goals of those who lead such as winning
reelection (Shipan and Volden, 2008).
Imitation occurs when one government seeks to have the same characteristics as
another (Berry and Berry, 2014). Government A adopts a policy adopted by B simply to
look like B (Shipan and Volden, 2008). Imitation occurs because policymakers within
government A see B as worthy of mirroring. This mirroring effect prompts government A
to adopt any policy that B adopts independent of any evaluation of the policy or its
effectiveness to achieve its set goals (Simmons et al., 2006). In many cases, policymakers
within the governments looked to “leader” or “signal” governments. The governments
may be characterized as leaders due to their size or wealth (Karch, 2006). They may have
also earned strong reputations or high levels of credibility through previous actions
(Grupp and Richards, 1975). In other cases, the governments imitated share
characteristics that make them role models or valuable peers (Weyland, 2004). For
example, many scholars have found that policymakers have a tendency to emulate policy
adoptions of governments that share similar partisan and ideological orientations
(Volden, 2006). It has been found that the major difference between learning and
imitation is that learning focuses on the action (the policy being adopted by another
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government) and imitation focuses on the actor (the other government that is adopting the
policy) (Shipan and Volden, 2008).

These previously mentioned factors are often coupled with normative pressure,
which is when a government submits to normative pressure of fellow adopters (Berry and
Berry, 2014); when there is adoption of a policy not because there is imitation of any
particular government or learning from the experience of other adopters, but because a
government observes that the policy is being widely adopted by other governments, and
because of the adopters shared norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Shared norms often
occur across societies (and states), allowing some policies to be adopted and later taken
for granted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Some scholars have pointed to the role of
experts within (state) governments in forging a consensus on norms (Haas, 1992).
For policies made by administrative agencies instead of legislatures, the shared
norms that accompany diffusion have been argued to be the result of professionalization
of agency personnel regardless of the area in which they serve and develop a shared
understanding of “good” policy by virtue of their common professional training
(Teodoro, 2009) and the new policy is further thought to be within “best practices” for
the same policies to be adopted elsewhere (Walker et al., 2011). Shared norms are often
further reinforced by the participation of those within intergovernmental professional
associations that constitute networks across which policies can diffuse (Berry and Berry,
2014).
Further, a policy diffuses through competition when a government’s decision on
whether to adopt the policy is motivated by the desire of state officials to achieve an
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economic advantage over other jurisdictions or to prevent other jurisdictions from
securing an advantage over it. In diffusion via competition, a government’s adoptions can
change the payoffs of adopting (Garrett, 2006). In location-choice competition, one type
of competition that many scholars describe, governments seek to influence the location
choices of individuals who are in a position to bring effective change in more than one
place, which usually is their own location (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). This would
bring potential monetary advantages to the area for which the policy is being
implemented, making the area more desirable.
Diffusion due to coercion is when entity A is more powerful than entity B, then A
is enabled to take actions that increase B’s reasons for wanting to adopt a certain policy
(Berry and Berry, 2014). This is sometimes accomplished by threatening action if the
weaker entity, for our purposes a state, does not acquiesce (Simmons et al., 2006).
Researchers studying diffusion in the American federal system focus on vertical coercion
(diffusion across levels of government). ln some cases, the national government can
simply mandate certain policies be enacted by states (Zamani-Gallaher, 2014) such as
emissions standards (Bhat et al., 2016). Another example would be that the US Supreme
Court can make rulings that limit state policy choices (Hoekstra, 2009). Other cases
where I find federal influence is a grant-in-aid creating a financial motivation for a state
to adopt where the government uses a carrot rather than a stick by creating an incentive
for a state to adopt a policy (Berry and Berry, 2014).

Each of these mechanisms focuses on a different channel of communication such
as federal directives or court rulings and differences across government means. What is
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found is that each state relies on one, or at times the combining of multiple mechanisms,
to justify why one government would emulate another government when making policy
decisions (Berry and Berry, 2014).
Situation Framework
Building upon the mechanisms already discussed, we find that when a state
finally chooses to adopt a policy, this takes place within a situation framework (Hartgen,
1973). The situation depicts a variety of constraints that serve to limit the effectiveness of
a given innovation. Further, these constraints include societal customs and norms, as well
as physical characteristics and economic conditions that make up a state (Hartgen, 1974).
A state’s resources are also either constraints or advantages that need to be
considered since they are needed to offset costs (Downs and Mohr, 1979). Thus, various
resources would logically become even “better, more stable predictors of innovation
when the associated costs are also considered” (Downs and Mohr, page 391, 1979).
Building on this, innovation on the basis of costs and benefits might seem naive
considering any behavior can obviously be reduced to “pleasure and pain” (Downs and
Mohr, page 392, 1979). Despite its universal applicability, benefit-cost analysis would be
not be used to explain all behavior. For the normal, routine types of state decisionmaking, a plethora of concepts including sequential attention to goals, resolution of
conflict, reaction to feedback, and problematic search can be employed (Cyert and
March, 1963). Further, for adaptive behavior, a technique including stimulus,
reinforcement, and learning comprise demonstrates a better response. A benefit-cost
configuration is a good descriptive model for innovation because innovation is
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instrumental as it is supposed to achieve a better result than the current policy. Therefore,
the consequences, both positive and negative, take up decision-making attention and
create a “comparative rational process” though the results may not be exact (Downs and
Mohr, 1979).
When utilizing the benefit-cost model, four key factors are considered when
undertaking a new policy; they include risk, average cost, uncertainty, and instability
(Downs and Mohr, 1979). Risk considers the degree of concern over possible disaster.
Average cost includes the cost of overall implementation and discontinuance. Uncertainty
considers the lack of confidence that the state has in its benefit-cost calculations. Lastly,
instability considers the future of benefits including fear that the benefit/cost ratio will
without warning decrease at some point (Downs and Mohr, 1979).
The ability for a government to innovate often relies on the extent of the resources
(including financial) that they have at their disposal (Berry and Berry, 2014). A state
would need sufficient resources in order to adopt a potential new policy. Some new
programs require major monetary investments, and therefore there must be the financial
resources available for adoption (Alland, 2004). This leads to the understanding that the
fiscal health of a government will have a positive or negative impact on its propensity for
policy adoption (Lowery, 2005). It can be argued that the capacity of a government to be
able to finance extensive public services is the ultimate determinant of a government’s
ability to innovate (Berry and Berry, 2014).
In general, the focus on resource availability has either been the total of financial
resources, or within the decision-making unit such as slack resources (Feller and Menzel,
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1977). According to Downs and Mohr (1979) five types of resources appear to have the
greatest impact, including wealth, manpower-expertise and time, equipment, information,
and staff tolerance for change. In other words, a state must have the financial ability, as
well as the human capital (both in numbers and expertise), in order to implement. There
also needs to be a learning component which is often gained through policy emulation
taken from ‘cue’ states, as well as the willingness of the participants such as states and
school districts in the case of this study, to see the policy to fruition.
Further, states may be required to meet additional performance standards as the
consequence of new legislation (Feller and Menzel, 1977). Education policies would be a
good example of this, with their attendant requirements that states develop
implementation plans to meet federally established educational standards. The need to
meet these requirements leads state and local agencies to look for the techniques that are
parts of enforcement programs and therefore makes them more open to the initiatives
(Feller and Menzel, 1977).
State policy innovations, such as the previously referenced Common Core and
value-added models, are heavily underwritten by federal funds, and are scrutinized by
federal officials in order to demonstrate compliance. Changes in objectives at the federal
level make it easier for state agencies who are in on-going negotiations with federal
agencies to receive certain types of funding which will keep states in tow with federal
policy objectives (Feller and Menzel, 1977). Additionally, federal pressures on state and
local governments to innovate are usually coupled with new financial resources which
serve to coerce states into complying with federal mandates. Federal funds appear to be
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the most important resources in state and local government, and therefore, are a major
influence on the obtaining of new technologies (Feller and Menzel, 1977).
In the above examples, states become funnels for which federal funds flow
through to the cities/counties. State influence may extend to the approval of specific
technologies which are later implemented at the county level. States may also advise
cities on best-practices and sway them to adopt state led initiatives. Additional actors
such as vendors may focus their efforts at convincing state agency officials of the
superiority of their product before going to local districts (Feller and Menzel, 1977).
Policy scholars have also hypothesized that “problem severity” is an important
determinant of the motivation to innovate (Berry and Berry, 2014). Problem severity can
influence the motivation of government officials to adopt a policy by defining the need
for the policy or indirectly by stimulating demand for the policy through the incitement of
societal groups (Berry and Berry, 2014). For example, poor economic conditions during
the COVID 19 pandemic contributed to the adoption of various aide programs which saw
an increase in the demand and need for assistance for basic needs such as housing, food,
and utilities (Tracking the COVID-19 economy’s effects on food, housing, and
employment hardships, 2022). Additionally, in his study, Stream (1999) looks at how the
rate of those who are uninsured within a state influences the likelihood that the state will
adopt various insurance reforms. When looking specifically at education reforms,
Mintrom and Vergari (1998) argue that the greater the ratio of state education funding to
local funding, the more likely that a state legislature will consider a reform such as school
choice.
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Alternatively, costs must also be calculated when considering policy innovation.
These can be broken down into decision costs and implementation costs (Downs and
Mohr, 1979). Decision costs are characterized as the costs of arriving at a decision to
implement an innovation or not, including to what extent and at what rate.
Implementation costs include the costs of actual implementation of the innovation
(Downs and Mohr, 1979).
Model Building of Value-Added Policies
Building off of previous literature, I construct a diffusion model that serves to
show how value-added policies have spread from one state to another. I specifically
further build on research regarding policy diffusion and state adoption of federal policy
which have largely been pioneered by Walker (1969), Gray (1973), and more recently,
Berry and Berry (1990). Walker (1969) concentrated on state diffusion and the rate at
which it occurred. Walker (1969) specifically attempted to answer why a state would be
more apt to adopt a policy program by looking at what informed the decision process of
the states.
I focus specifically on the diffusion of education policy, looking at why states
would adopt the policy of tying teacher pay and evaluations to student test performance. I
theorize that in the context of educational policy, states are more likely to adopt policy
that has been enacted by “early adopters.” Once a policy is implemented by neighboring
states, states will then be more likely to adopt the proposed policy due to increased
regional pressure. In conjunction with state pressures, internal demands of state
governments such as economic constraints. Additionally, the federal government also
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influences the adoption of state policy through incentives such as grants. The influence of
the federal government, internal components, and the adoption of policy in neighboring
states will reinforce one another when considering educational policy adoption; all
working together and creating a higher propensity for policy adoption.
Regional Diffusion
Further, Walker (1969) assumes that “pioneering states” gain their reputation
because of the speed at which they readily accept new programs. These pioneer states
would have what Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) would call 100% psychological
trialability; these are instances in which the potential adopter does not need experience to
decide whether or not to adopt, but instead, simply tries out the innovation. Walker
(1969) analyzes this with the use of a regression model and developing an innovation
score based on at least twenty states having enacted policies in the areas of welfare,
health, education, conservation, planning, administrative organization, highways, civil
rights, corrections and police, labor, taxes, and professional organization. What Walker
(1969) found was that certain states were seen as “pace setters” within their region.
Neighboring states look to these states to take their cue on policy adoption. These states
would serve as what Downs and Mohr (1979) call an advocate; for each new idea studied,
these states would serve as a source to other potential adopter states. These “pace setters”
(Walker, 1969) have the important conceptual role of specifying the benefits and costs
that are connected with a policy and the point at which adopting organizations can assess
these benefits and costs accurately (Downs and Mohr, 1979).
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Walker (1969) concluded that there was a continuum of how quick states are to
accept policy innovations. Walker divided the country into five regions and conducted a
regression of the rate at which a state would adopt a given policy. This created a
hierarchy of adoption that demonstrated either a likelihood for innovation or a reluctance
to accept innovation. Walker also noted that improved communications between states,
especially state officials speaking to their regional counterparts, increased the
acceleration of diffusion. He concluded that there is a national system of emulation based
on regional groupings. These systems set the norms and national standards for policy
adoption. Walker’s work was the first of its kind to examine the diffusion of policy when
taking into consideration regional proximity.
Adding to the literature of policy diffusion among states, Virginia Gray (1973)
simplified her focus on policies, looking specifically at education, welfare, and civil
rights. Gray found similar results to that of Walker: an interactive effect where states who
have not yet adopted are influenced by adopters in their region (Gray, 1973).
Significantly, Gray found that states vary in their level of support for policy
adoption based upon specific stimuli such as federal grants. This differs from what
Walker anticipated, which was that states would show uniform adoption simply on the
criteria of the adoption influence of neighboring states. Gray’s study shows that though
neighboring state influence is one component of adoption, it is only part of the reason
why a state would adopt a particular policy. The policy in conjunction with state
dynamics and incentives were highly correlated with adoption; in other words, whether a
state had a Republican or Democrat governor and if the state was offered a large grant
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from the federal government played a large role in the adoption of policy. Further,
adoption of one policy under a particular area, education for example, did not guarantee
the adoption of further education policies (Gray, 1973). This adds to the understanding of
diffusion that was fostered under the Walker model and demonstrated, unlike Walker’s
prediction, that policy diffusion in states does not just focus on “innovative states” for
their cue on whether or not to adopt a specific policy. The states also look inwardly to
ensure the policy aligns with the needs and political ideologies of the state itself.
Building on this, Feller and Menzel (1977) found the primary determinant of
decision making when concerning the adoption of new innovations within states is the
mission agency nor the central administration. Additionally, agencies adopt new
technological innovations in response to pressures that come from outside of the
organization (Feller and Menzel, 1977). In many of the circumstances, the pressure is
related to the technology and can be likened to being approached by a salesman offering
a new product (Feller and Menzel, 1977). While in other cases, agencies are confronted
with new problems and then will seek a solution to the problem (Feller and Menzel,
1977). This may involve the adoption of a completely different technique (Feller and
Menzel, 1977).

Federalism
What many of these studies have hinted at, but not fully vetted, is the role of
federalism in policy diffusion. Andrew Karch (2006) looked at national intervention
regarding diffusion in which he claims the motivation to implement a policy stem from a
“problematic social condition” such as high unemployment rates. He claims that it is a
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trifecta of influence from the state, regional, and national forces working in conjunction
that determine the adoption of policy. The study only focused on what may prevent a
state from adopting a policy, such as funding. This allows us to understand why a state
that may want to adopt a policy did not do so but does not examine the internal
determinates of a state that would specifically allow for adoption to occur.

Political responses to new policy ideas change based on how politicians and the
public define a problem (Boushey, 2012). When considering how problem definitions can
change political responses to public issues, focus is needed on agenda setting. By looking
at the policy problem from a different angle that policy reform can begin to take shape
and generate interest in the policy problem at hand (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).
Scholars have found that changing policy environments lead to the acceptance of
a different policy image (Kingdon, 1984). Additionally, abrupt changes to policy can
result from a focusing event that provides a shock to the system and redirects attention to
the central policy issue such as our nation’s failing schools highlighted in a Nation at
Risk (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).
Federalism can make policy coordination difficult (Pralle, 2003). However,
federalism can also create opportunities for policy innovation to take place, as municipal,
county, and state governments create a new way of responding to local concerns
(Boushey, 2012). This takes place through venue shopping where activists and interest
groups take their concerns to multiple government venues in an attempt to obtain
increased support for their ideas (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). This can create
favorable conditions for the rapid spread of innovative programs or new policy images
95

(Holyoke, 2003). However, federalism can create both opportunities and constraints for
the spread of new policy. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) found that expanded attention to
an issue can result in the nationalization of the issue and can lead to the nationalization of
policy attention and what was once only a localized concern has now garnered national
merit. This allows for the federal government to act as a powerful engine of change for
state policy adoption.
Further, positive feedback cycles can also occur even without the federal
government being at the helm (Boushey, 2012). Issue attention can also be nationalized
through the collaborative efforts of interest groups that advocate for policy reform,
bringing their campaign across states (Boushey, 2010).
As alluded to previously, it is the combination of policy image and institutional
venue that is critical for understanding why policy diffusion may occur (Boushey, 2012).
When issues gai national attention, policy can rapidly diffuse when its adoption across
the country is mandated by the federal government (Boushey, 2012). When an event
occurs that creates a large amount of attention within a state, diffusion may occur and
create a “policy bandwagon” as states attempt to quickly emulate the innovations of their
peer states (Boushey, 2012).
Internal and External Determinants
Diffusion of policy needs to take in consideration both internal and external
characteristics. Examples of internal characteristics include political factors such as state
party control, urbanization, and relative state poverty levels. External determinants look
at how policies spread from one state to another and the factors surrounding the
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occurrence (Li, 2017). Attributes of innovation include cost, relative advantage,
communicability, complexity, trialability, and susceptibility to successive modification.
While attributes of the adopter include motivation, professionalism, informedness,
resources, pride, risk, and propensity (Feller and Menzel, 1977). However, it is important
for the potential adopter to understand both what policy innovation can offer in terms of
benefits, as well as the position of the adopter to innovate (whether they have the
resources and motivation to adopt).
In order to understand innovation of policy adoption, I need to distinguish
between the diffusion and adoption stages. This eliminates a “bi-dimensionality” in the
thinking of time of adoption (Downs and Mohr, 1979). By restricting attention to the
adoption stage, it becomes possible to research both the time of adoption and the extent
of use within the same theoretical framework (Downs and Mohr, 1979). However, when
considering the earliness of adoption after the point of awareness this becomes a matter
of state strategic decision making (Downs and Mohr,1979).
Expanding on this, Berry and Berry (1990) added an additional element by
utilizing event history analysis to look at the influences of nearby states. Berry and Berry
(1990) used similar models and looked at state lottery adoptions which reflected both the
internal and regional influences. This built upon research done by Walker (1969) and
Gray (1973) by combining what both had done into one comprehensive study of policy
diffusion. Berry and Berry (1990) acknowledged, as did Gray (1973) previously, that a
state will not blindly emulate its neighbor states’ policies without its public officials
being influenced by the political and economic environment of its own state (Berry,
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Stokes, and Berry, 1990). Previous models look at a state’s motivation to innovate and
the availability of resources to overcome any obstacles. They further theorize that as
motivation to innovate increases so do the obstacles. The increase in obstacles is due to
unexpected increases in monetary demands and resources needed to implement. Also,
unpopular policy should be easier to overcome and justify to voters if the policy has first
been adopted by nearby states (Berry, Stokes, and Berry, 1990). The study found both
elements to be true; innovation is positively associated with the desire to take new
approaches, and negatively associated with the strength of the obstacles (Berry, Stokes,
and Berry, 1990). This is directly related to the availability of resources to overcome the
obstacles. They also found that neighboring state influence was highest when internal
characteristics of a state were favorable for adoption; in the case of a state lottery this
would include the poor fiscal health of a state which would benefit from the influx of
currency generated by a state lottery (Berry, Stokes, and Berry, 1990). The study
furthered the use and understanding of event history analysis and its use on rarely
occurring events such as looking at specific policy and route to adoption.
All of these groundbreaking pieces have expanded the scope of policy diffusion
which stretches across policy domains such as education (Key, 1949), technology
(Menzel and Feller, 1977), energy (Regens, 1980), and even tort law (Canon and Baum,
1981). Normally, what these studies have focused on is the timing of when a state adopts
a given policy.
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Additional Explanations for Adoption
When considering the proliferation of value-added models, what we find is that
traditionally, the two most dominant factors in why a state would adopt a specific
education policy were proximity to fellow adopters and partisanship within states.
Building off earlier concepts, Republican led administrations tend favor personal
accountability. For example, when considering healthcare, Republicans would say that
people have a responsibility to take care of their own needs; if healthy people fail to take
out health insurance, and then fall sick, that is therefore of their own doing. Democrats,
on the other hand, would retort that we owe people health care irrespective of the choices
they've made (Illing, 2017).
With education policy, Republican led administrations have been some of the first
adopters of having funding tied to results (Jochim and Lavery, 2015). Policies that favor
personal responsibility tend to be more conservative in nature. Education policies are no
exception. Thus, a policy that ties classroom teacher accountability to set student
achievement, along with merit incentives should tend to be more readily accepted and
adopted in more conservative states and propagated by a conservative executive.
When such measures are on the state’s agenda, states with lower per capita
income, and thus lower per pupil spending, are more apt to hold accountability for funds
disbursed since the resource is at a minimum and needs to be closely monitored. These
same states tend to also be conservative and with lower incomes and thus states would
want to ensure a return on investment of funds distributed.
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Education policies that favor a direct return on funds disbursed are meritocratic in
nature. As such according to previous literature, merit policy can be explained in part by
partisanship and urbanization levels within the state (McLendon et al., 2006; Li, 2017;
Howell and Magazinnick, 2017).
In this study, I address this question by combining the methods put forth by Berry
and Berry with the utilization of event history analysis, as well build upon the work of
Gray and Walker by noting neighboring state influence and internal determinants. This
will give an understanding of which states are more likely to adopt policies based on the
pressure from “early adopters”, as well as look at the motivating factors such as pressure
groups, in determining why states are more apt to adopt certain policies.

Summary
This chapter has looked at the concept of the diffusion of innovation. There are
several reasons a given policy may diffuse including ideology, mimicking effects,
emulation, regional pressure, and cues from known policy innovators. Previous literature
has highlighted the importance in understanding the roles that each of these factors plays
in how a policy can spread. This study will build on this concept of how policies diffuse.
I will look at various reasons for policy diffusion throughout the country, taking into
consideration the effects of previous similar policy adoption along with the role both
internal and external determinants may play.
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CHAPTER 6
Data and Methods- Hypotheses for State Adoption of Value-Added Models
The focus of this research looks at why value-added models diffused across states.
Using lessons learned by scholars of policy diffusion and innovation, I will present a
series of hypotheses that may help to explain the adoption of the policy of interest. I will
then go on to explain the variables that were controlled for within the models and their
significance in previous literature. Next, I will identify the data that will be used to
operationalize the concepts contained in the hypotheses. Lastly, I will explain the
statistical methodology that will be used to test each of the hypotheses.
When considering the adoption of new educational policies, implementation often
depends on adequate funds to support professional development of teachers and other
staff, additional investments in curriculum, tests, technology and other instructional
supports. In many cases, changes to state accountability systems, such as linking student
test scores to teachers, and using student test scores to evaluate teachers, fall under the
purview of elected state policymakers (Jochim and Lavery, 2015). What this
demonstrates is a need for funding and a favorable state legislation for policy
implementation to take place. There is also a learning aspect to policy adoption, as
previously discussed, with states taking their cue from “early adopters” of policies and
then reconstructing the policy to fit their particular state needs. With the vast majority of
states, 32 out of 50, choosing to implement value-added models of merit pay, I seek to
explain why the policy diffused across states by proposing seven hypotheses that seek to
explain diffusion rates.
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Hypotheses
States will take their cues for adoption from early adopter states. Among the early
explanations for policy adoption, scholars identified the importance of states regarded as
innovators and, also, regional influences. Hence, this leads to the first three hypotheses.
The innovative state (first state to adopt the policy) within their region will demonstrate
the effectiveness and/or challenges of the policy to the other states. As additional states
within the region adopt similar policies (mitigating for challenges previously presented),
there will then be pressure for any states that have not adopted the policy to follow suit
and conform with the region.
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a state will adopt the educational policy of
value-added models for teacher evaluations increases when it is “signaled” by a regional
cue state. Diffusion will begin at the cue state and move outward from this origin point.
Each region of the U.S. has a “cue” state for policy adoption. These four cue states (New
York, Nevada, Kentucky and Oklahoma) are normally the first within the region to pilot a
new educational policy within their schools. The states reflected as cue states are
recognized for first adopting Common Core within their region. They are as follows:
New York for the Northeast, Nevada for the West, Kentucky for the Southeast, and
Oklahoma for the Midwest (Achieve, 2013). Walker (1969) noted that certain states were
seen as “pace setters” within their region and neighboring states look to these states to
take their cue on policy adoption. Once the policy has been adopted by the cue state, it
signals to surrounding states to adopt the same or similar educational policies.
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This differs from regions since regions are broader in nature whereas, with cue states,
fellow state leaders look specifically at one state for innovation with diffusion outward
from the one cue state. While cue states provide a signal regarding policy adoption to an
entire region, the diffusion of policy also is influenced by the actions of neighboring
states.
Hypothesis 2: The probability that a state will adopt the educational policy of
value-added models for teacher evaluations increases with the extent to which bordering
states adopt the policy.
Similar to the case with cue states, many states are hesitant to be the first to adopt
a new and innovative policy. However, if the policy is first tested by a state that borders
and the policy is viewed as worthwhile and continued, then a state is more likely
themselves to adopt the same or similar policy.
Hypothesis 3: The probability that a state will adopt the educational policy of
value-added models for teacher evaluations increases with the extent to which states
within their circuit court regions have adopted the same policy.
The concept of regional influence does not have to mean only being next door to
another state. It can also mean that states within a region can influence one another
through shared regional issues. For instance, state compacts are tools that states use to
address problems that are not contained within formal political boundaries. For this
reason, I examine regional influence by looking at geographic clusters of states.
States within the same region share similar ideologies (Walker, 1969). This
hypothesis tests the notion that states are likely to mimic one another when they share
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regional commonality. In other words, I am looking not just at the neighbor that a state
directly borders, but any neighbor within the same subdivision, in this case circuit.
Circuits will be defined by which federal circuit court each state falls within. Regional
political ideology will be represented by circuit court regions.
It is therefore assumed that states within the same circuit would be apt to adopt
similar education policies with diffusion occurring around the same time. Additionally,
circuit regions serve as a proxy for the diffusion of regional ideology. There are eleven
total throughout the US. Previous diffusion literature has not looked at circuits court
regions and with partisanship at time high levels (Taylor and Watts, 2020), I should see
diffusion of policy between states within the same circuit court region. Additionally,
regional circuit courts are a reasonable proxy for general regional influence since rulings
handed down by the courts should be adopted in a similar fashion by all states within the
circuit.
The diffusion of innovation literature also identified the impact of policies that lay
the groundwork for other policies. It is by understanding how a policy diffuses that we
are able to foresee favorable conditions for future policy endeavors. It is that general
explanation that I am drawing on to develop hypotheses #4-6.
Hypothesis 4: States that adopted the policy of performance-based funding for
higher education are more likely to adopt meritocratic measures proposed by the federal
government when concerning K-12 and value-added models.
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Performance-based funding ties state education funds to set outcomes such as
graduation rates. The practice is both coercive and a form of accountability for
institutions in higher education.
States having piloted the accountability program of performance-based funding
and shown success in the increase graduation will signal for the additional piloting of
these type programs in the K-12 system. Value-added models are similar in how they
were rolled out and hold accountability. States that have already had success with
performance-based funding in higher should be better primed and therefore more likely to
adopt future accountability policies such as value-added models.
Hypothesis 5: States that adopted the policy of incentivizing teachers to work in
targeted, low incomes areas, are more likely to adopt meritocratic measures proposed by
the federal government when concerning K-12 and value-added models.
Target schools are defined as schools that are low performing (not meeting minimum
standardized testing requirements and/or making required student testing gains) that are
targeted for reform (Torre et al., 2012). In many cases these schools have been “taken
over” (under the direct purview) of the state (Torre et al., 2012). Hard-to staff schools are
defined as urban and rural, high-poverty, high-minority, and low-achieving schools
(Opfer, 2011). Hard-to-staff schools are often found in inner cities with a high percentage
of the student population living in poverty (Allen, 2000). Additionally, hard-to-staff
schools are also found in rural areas that are in economically depressed or isolated
districts and tend to offer low salaries or lack the amenities that more urban areas have
that would attract better qualified teachers (Allen, 2000). Incentivizing teachers to work
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in these targeted schools allows for states to staff “hard to employ” positions within their
district and allows for teachers to receive monetary compensation for additional effort
being put forth in these turn-around situations. With increased effort equating to an
increase in pay, this scenario becomes meritocratic in nature. It is reasonable to presume
that a state that is willing to engage in one type of meritocratic practice would also
employ another similar measure.
Hypothesis 6: States that adopted common core policies, are more likely to adopt
meritocratic measures proposed by the federal government when concerning K-12 and
value-added models.
States who had previously adopted Common Core policies to stay in compliance with
federal curriculum mandates would therefore feel the same compulsion to stay in
compliance with federal policies and therefore more apt to adopt value-added models.

Internal Factors
In all of my models I include controls for Republican government control of the
state, urbanization, per pupil spending, poverty, and strength of teacher unions. Previous
research has shown these variables to be significant and can add to why state may adopt a
meritocratic policy.
The probability that a state will adopt the educational policy of value-added
models for teacher evaluations is greater when the governorship and both houses of
legislature are under Republican Party control.
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The Republican Party is conservative in fiscal matters. An educational policy that
would only fiscally reward a public university or college would fall under the umbrella of
a conservative policy and potentially punitive in nature. Conversely, Democrats tend to
support less punitive policies, therefore, states where Democrats control the state
legislature and governorship should be less likely to adopt the educational policy (Allen
et al., 2004).
Previous studies such as Berry and Berry (1990), McLendon et al. (2006), Yi
(2017), and Walker (1969) all include Republican state control in their models. All
mentioned scholars have found the presence of Republican control to be significant in
their understanding of why diffusion was occurring. This is an important finding since
states with Republican leadership were more likely to adopt meritocratic policies since,
as stated in previous chapters, accountability measures tend to be conservative in nature
and follow closely with Republican ideals. This would demonstrate that ideology is a key
factor when considering policy adoption.
The probability that a state will adopt the educational policy of value-added
models for teacher evaluations is greater when the state has a lower percentage of urban
areas.
An area is considered urban if it has a population of 50,000 (US Census Bureau,
2016) residing within the geographically defined city limits. Large urban areas like New
York City have the capacity to identify and elect to be the first to implement policies that
many small rural jurisdictions cannot support. Rural departments are more likely to have
less experienced staff, tend to have districts with limited resources, and are often isolated
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from other districts which may provide support or guidance. They also may have a lower
tax base from which to pull additional education funding. In addition to limitations on
staffing and funding, small rural jurisdictions tend to have fewer local partner
organizations (Harris and Mueller, 2013). In larger districts, schools may have more
opportunities to work with organizations, citizen groups, businesses, and others who aid
in policy development and other activities (Harris and Mueller, 2013). It is because of
these partnerships within the urban communities and better trained educators that makes
states more likely to enact a new policy.
Steinhubel et al. (2020) in their work looked at rural versus urban adoption of
technology. They found that the more urban an area, the more likely it is for adoption to
occur due to things like social interaction which effects the overall number of possible
adopters and supports further diffusion. This is key since the more urban areas allow for
additional access points in the understanding and perpetuation of the novel policy and
leads to higher adoption rates.
The lower the per capita per pupil spending is, the higher probability that the state will
adopt the educational policy of value-added models for teacher evaluations.
Grants were designed to help states accomplish goals (Welch and Thompson,
1980). States that invest in students expect to see a return on their investment. However,
states that spend less per pupil in higher education would be more likely to become
vested in the program of performance-based funding since their public colleges and
universities are more reliant on state funds. To this extent, the funds being offered and
tied to higher education graduation rates, would be most attractive to those states that also
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have some of the lowest per pupil spending in the country: $2,419 (AZ), $3,542 (VT),
$3,185 (NH), $4,302 (PA), and $4,494 (KS) (Science and Engineering State Indicators,
2020). Regarding per pupil spending, I use data derived from the USA Facts study on
geographic disparity which looks specifically at per pupil spending along with state
educational rankings over time (USA Facts, 2021).
Further, Jackson et al. (2016) found that per pupil spending each year for all 12
years of public-school leads to 0.31 more completed years of education, an overall return
of 7 percent higher wages, and a 3.2 percentage point reduction in the annual incidence of
adult poverty. This would lead to the understanding that per pupil spending is vital to a
student’s education, especially when I consider those in the lower income brackets. This
finding demonstrates that it is likely that states who are dependent upon federal education
funds due to lower per pupil allocations would be more apt to be in compliance with any
federal mandates.
The poverty of a state will make the state more likely to adopt the policy of valueadded models for teacher evaluations.
Based on previous research, I should see states with high poverty rates more
likely to adopt the policy of tying teacher pay/evaluations to student test scores. The
influx of state funds attached to policy adoption should serve as an incentive for lower
social economic states and help in an attempt to elevate student achievement.
In their study, Welch and Thompson (1980) looked at federal incentives that were
used to ensure compliance by states and specifically at diffusion rates. They found that
the federal government, through its fiscal incentives, could speed the rate at which policy
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innovation occurred in the state. Further, incentives of direct fiscal aid are found to be
more effective than indirect incentives in encouraging rapid early diffusion, but both
types of federal incentives are found to be about equal in promoting diffusion through all
states (Welch and Thompson, 1980). What this amounts to is that states that have higher
overall poverty rates, are among the first to enact federal policies when they are tied to
funding as doing so provides aid to an already burdened system.
The strength of the teachers’ union in a state is negatively correlated with the
likelihood that a state will adopt the educational policy.
Teacher unions have a vested interest in protecting their teachers. This may come
in the form of pay negotiations, maximum hours worked, requirements levied by the
state, etc. To effectively negotiate, the union needs to be seen as strong. This can be
accomplished through a vast member base, strong leadership, and fiscal health. When a
union is seen as weak, the state can impose more demands upon teachers without
additional pay increases. The state would also be able to enact policy that may be seen as
detrimental to the teacher’s job security such as tying their evaluation to the test scores of
their students. I propose that a strong union would be able to block such a policy from
taking effect and ensure teacher job security.
Additionally, Hartley and Flavin (2011), Marianno (2020), and Jha et al. (2019)
all found that teachers’ unions, depending on their strength, were able to lobby for either
the adoption or rejection of proposed education policies within the state legislature. This
is a significant finding since this would help to explain why education policies within a
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state may be adopted or fail to get traction on the floor of the state legislature which
could further or halt policy adoption.
Data
State adoption of value-added models is visualized using data from the National
Council for Teach Quality study which breaks down the states which adopted valueadded model and the year in which adoption first took place (Teacher and principal
evaluation policy, 2019).
The dependent variable or hazard rate ADOPTi,t is the conditional probability that
state i will adopt the value-added model given that the state has not adopted a valueadded model prior to year t (Berry and Berry, 1990). The hazard rate measures the
likelihood of an event to fail (die) depending on the age it has reached. It predicts the
amount of time until a certain event occurs, such as the death or failure of a value-added
policies or component (Liberto, 2021). The predicted values of the dependent variable are
in essence the probability that the policy is adopted. ADOPTi,t is measured as a dummy
variable equaling one if state i adopts a value-added model in year t, zero otherwise
(Berry and Berry, 1990). It is because of this that the model takes the form of a logistic
regression. Data on state adoption dates of value-added models will be derived from the
National Council on Teacher Quality (State-by-State Evaluation Timeline Briefs, 2018).
BORDERi,t-1 is the term reflecting influence of bordering states and denotes the
proportion of previously adopting neighboring states. In other words, the number of states
sharing a border with state i that had adopted a value-added model prior to year t. The
values were estimated by calculating the ratio of states sharing a border that had
111

previously adopted a value-added model. I examined the influence of bordering state
adoption at zero-, one-, and two-year lags. However, it was found that the one and twoyear lags did not produce substantively different results from a 0-year lag, so only the 0year lag in retained for the reported model. Further, I followed the other education policy
literature (McLendon et al., 2006; Berry and Berry, 1990) in dropping the first adopter (in
this case, Florida) from the analysis to prevent bias. BORDERi,t-1 is a continuous variable
ranging from 0 to 1. A separate model was estimated that includes the border state
variable so that the presence of this variable would not interfere with the presence of the
variables for cue states and/or circuit court regions.
When considering “cue” states, I used the idea of states labeled as “pace-setting”
states in previous studies conducted by Walker (1969) and Downs and Mohr (1979). The
states reflected as cue states are recognized for first adopting Common Core within their
region.
CUEi,t-1 is the term reflecting whether a state qualifies as a signal state within the
totality of the United States. Once the “cue” state adopts the value-added model, I should
see this policy diffuse to other states in the following year. The four regions are the
Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, and West. The cue states for each of these regions are
New York, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Nevada, respectively. I identified the CUEi,t-1 states
based on their early adoption of other educational policies and their reputation as
innovative in educational policy (Walker, 1969). Cue is a continuous variable ranging
from 0 to 1.
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US courts of appeals, or circuit courts, were taken from USCourts.gov which
delineates the twelve circuits and which states fall into each specific circuit (Court role
and Structure, 2022). Only eleven circuits will be compared since the twelfth circuit of
Washington D.C. will not be used and dropped from the data. States within the same
circuit should share similar political ideologies and therefore adopt similar policies, so
using the circuits as a regional measure should demonstrate diffusion among states
within.
As with the border state model, a separate model was created for testing the
hypothesis related to US courts of appeals so that there would not any interference with
border or cue states. As with the previous model, ADOPT looks at the probability that a
state will adopt the value-added model policy.
Ten binary variables were created to represent 10 of the 11 U.S. courts of appeals
circuits included in the data. The base category not explicitly represented with a binary
variable in the model is the 11th Circuit which contains Florida. This decision was made
because Florida was the first state to adopt value-added models and serves as the region
against which others are compared.
In order to determine the extent that states who first adopted performance-based
funding would then be apt to adopt a further accountability policy of tying teacher pay to
student test scores, or value-added models, data on state adoption dates will be derived
from the National Council on Teacher Quality (State-by-State Evaluation Timeline
Briefs, 2018).
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PBFi,t is a binary variable with the value one representing adoption of
performance-based funding and zero for no adoption. I also examine whether early
adoption of performance-based funding serves as a predictor for value-added policy
adoption by dividing the states into three categories of early, mid, and late adoption in the
PBF wave variable.
In determining incentivization for targeted schools, I use data derived from the
National Center for Education Statistics. The data was collected over the 2011-2012
school year and displays which states (a total of 20) enacted an incentivization program
within the state to attract K-12 teachers to hard-to-staff schools/areas (State Education
Practices SEP, 2012). INCENTIVEi,t is an ordinal variable ranging from zero to two that
represents the degree of incentivized teacher pay at target schools. This is estimated by a
combined value of targeted schools and hard to staff teaching assignment variables. A
value of zero indicates that a state is neither hard to staff nor a target school, whereas a
value of one represents one or the other, and a value of two indicates that a state is both
targeted and hard to staff.
Data for adoption of Common Core policies is derived from the official Common
Core standards website (Standards in your State, 2022). The site breaks down the policy
by state and gives exact adopt data, and in some cases, repeal dates. COMMONi,t is a
binary variable with a value of one indicating that a state adopted Common Core and a
value of zero if a state did not.
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When looking at Republican control, it will be broken down into two variables,
one for governor and one for the legislature. The governorship variable is a binary where
1 indicates a Republican governor in office and zero indicates a Democratic governor.
The legislature variable represents party control of the state legislature by the
Republican party. A coding of 1 indicates Republican control of both houses within the
legislature and a coding of 0 indicates that there is not Republican control of both houses
within the state. Nebraska, which is unicameral, will be coded as 1 for Republican control
and 0 for not having Republican control of the legislature. The data for both variables
will be taken from Gubernatorial and Legislative Party Control of State Government in
Ballotopia (2019).
To understand which states have higher relative poverty rates, I will use census
data from 2002-2019. The variable is the percentage of a state’s population that is in
poverty, ranging between 0 and 1.
The student spending variable takes into consideration how much each state
spends on average per student. To accomplish this, I will use data reported by states
regarding per pupil education spending to the USA Facts study on geographic disparity
(Spending per student in k-12 public schools, 2021). Data collected from years 20112016 will be used. The data is reported from both state and local contributions. The
variable represents state spending in thousands of dollars per pupil.
Depicting which states have a higher urban population, I will use census data
from 2010. The variable population density is the proportion of a state’s population living
in an urban area, ranging from 0 to 1.
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Teacher unions, if strong, can have substantial influence over the ability for a
state to implement a policy that will affect teacher pay. The variable represents the
relative power teacher unions have in a state. For this study, union strength, is an ordinal
variable that ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 being a strong, robust union that has previously
shown influence on policy and 5 being either an extremely weak, or the lack of a union,
and therefore wields no influence on policy. Data for the variable was derived from a
study conducted by Northern et al. (2012) which gave an overall ranking of state
teachers’ unions by strength and tier based up the following five criteria: 1) Resources
and Membership, 2) Involvement in Politics, 3) Scope of Bargaining, 4) State Policies,
and 5) Perceived Influence.
The sample used in the analysis includes the fifty states in the United States, but
does not include the US territories, Puerto Rico, or Washington, DC.
Model Estimation Method
In this study, I will be using event history analysis which is the application of
logistic regression in a time series model. The research centers around the reasoning
behind why one state would adopt the value-added educational policy and considers
potential adoption motivators. The probability of the policy adoption will be determined
based on the events described in the hypotheses.
The dependent variable is the policy adoption of value-added models. The unit of
analysis will be state-years. For event history analysis, the first step is to establish the
first year any state adopted the educational policy of the value-added model for teacher
evaluations (advent of the policy), which was Florida in 2011. With not all states having
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currently adopted the policy, the end date will be 2016 since no additional states have
adopted value-added models past this time. This gives a total time span of 5 years.
The methodology being employed is event history analysis. As explained by
Berry and Berry (1990), Event History Analysis goal is to explain qualitative change that
occurs in the behavior of an individual (or in this case a state). It is a longitudinal record
showing if and when the event was experienced. In a discrete model, used in this study,
the period of analysis is divided into distinct units (years) (Berry and Berry, 1990).

Event history analysis is frequently used by scholars to model policy adoption. I
follow previous studies on education policy (Li, 2017) and policy diffusion (Walker,
1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry, 1990, 1992, 2007), and use a Cox proportionalhazards model. I chose this nonparametric model because I had no expectations as to the
probability of states adopting value added policies being time dependent. The dependent
variable, then, is the hazard ratio of value-added policy adoption. For each model, I
examined the Schoenfeld residuals and tested each model for violations of the Cox
proportional hazards assumption (Fox, 2002; Liu, 2017).
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CHAPTER 7
Results
In this chapter, I first describe the division of my three models and report the
results of my regressions, predictive margins tests, and average marginal effects. I note
areas of significance with my independent variables that test for the adoption of valueadded model policies. Second, I follow this with further discussion that investigates the
findings within the independent variables. This will add to the findings of previous
literature and speak to potential reasons for policy adoption. Lastly, I discuss my
conclusions regarding the findings of the quantitative analyses conducted in this chapter.
The time span of my data ranges from 2011 when value-added policies were first
implemented until 2016 the year that the last state adopted the policy. To evaluate the
hypotheses, I estimated eleven different models. Figure 8.1 below depicts the hazard ratio
for the dependent variable (adoption of value-added models). The “steps” show the
proportions of states that chose to adopt policy over the six-year time span, with many
choosing to adopt within the first two years of policy roll-out. There is an even pattern of
adoption for the subsequent four years. The first state to adopt a value-added model did
not do so until two years after the Race to the Top grant program was created. By the end
of the fourth year, more than half had done so, and by the end of the period under study
only a handful of states had yet to adopt such a model.
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Results and Discussion
Model 1, reported in Table 7.1, tests the cue state variable that looks at which
states tend to be first adopters of education policy innovations in their region. I use the
Common Core policy adoption timeline to designate signal states in each region (New
York, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Nevada) and look at if there are influences in the
behavior of others within their region. I also look at whether the timing of performancebased funding adoption influences state adoption.
Teacher incentives tests whether states that provide incentives to teachers such as
additional pay would therefore be more likely to further adopt the incentivized program
of value-added models. Lastly, model 1 tests whether having priorly adopted the policy
of Common Core would influence states to adopt value-added models.
In the rest of the models, I chose to include states typically excluded from the
policy literature; Hawaii, Alaska, and Nebraska, as I had no reason to assume that they
would be excluded from the effects the model. Hawaii and Alaska, for instance, are often
excluded because they are not contiguous, hence their exclusion in our estimation of
geographic diffusion. Nonetheless, both states still have all the other characteristics I
posit explain adoption. I argue it would be unreasonable in the digital age to discount
states solely based on their geography. I also include Nebraska despite its unique
unicameral legislature, as I argue many of those factors such as poverty and urbanization
are exogenous. Moreover, even if policy is easy to pass, I still expect to see those same
dynamics I expect in other states including the significance of party control and spending.
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Table 7.1
Policy Indicators
Model 1

1

1

Model 1 reports hazard-ratios with standard errors.
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Figure 7.2
Value-Added Model
Adoption by State and Year
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Figure 7.3
Performance-Based Policy
Adoption by State and Year
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Region

States
Northeast

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware

Southeast

Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North
Carlina, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas,
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia,
Kentucky

Midwest

Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota

West

California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada,
Arizona, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico,
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming

Figure 7.4
Region and State Break-up for Cue States
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When testing the key hypotheses of my models with the just mentioned variables,
I include in all of the models the following control variables: Republican control the
legislature, Republican governorship, state education spending per pupil, percent of state
population living in poverty, strength of teacher unions, and population density.
Internal variables for teachers union, governor party, percentage poverty, and per
pupil spending all demonstrated statistical significance in the expected direction in the
model. This is in line with previous policy diffusion literature.
One control variable, spending per a pupil, was slightly significant when testing
for robustness. Though, as a whole the models were not. I followed Thernau et al. (2021)
in re-estimating the models by transforming the variables and using a stepwise function.
For all the models, I tested the assumption of time invariance and found that none of our
models violated the assumption globally. However, both spending and cue states
individually were almost significant. To ensure the robustness of the results, I reestimated the models first with a step function and second with a continuous function to
describe the time-varying coefficient. The purpose of the step function model is to split
the analysis time into several intervals and stratify the Cox proportional model for these
time intervals. This helps to account for any variation in the effects over time. The steps
were chosen based on a graph of the Schoenfeld test for each variable. I also estimated
the models by transforming the time-varying coefficients with a parametric continuous
function. Both re-estimations had similar results to the primary models. The results from
these were functionally the same. In addition, I followed Li (2017) in generating the Cox-
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Snell residuals from the martingale residuals, which I then plotted against the NelsonAalen estimates to assess the fit of each model.
Table 7.1 shows the effects of policy diffusion by cue states, performance-based
funding, teacher incentives and Common Core adoption. All of the variables tested were
significant at the .01 level. Cue states is a binary variable with values of 0 and 1.
Performance-based funding is a binary variable with zero indicating a state did
not adopt performance-based funding and a value of one indicating that a state did adopt.
Teacher incentives is an ordinal variable ranging from zero to two. A value of zero
indicates that a state is neither hard to staff nor a targeted school, whereas a value of one
represents one or the other, and a value of two indicates that a state is both targeted and
hard to staff. Lastly, Common Core is again binary variable with a value of one for
adoption and zero for no adoption.
Cue states had the largest impact and increased the likelihood of adoption, making
states surrounding cue states three times more likely to adopt the value-added model
policy. States were grouped by larger regions, as seen in Figure 7.4, of northeast,
southeast, midwest, and west. This demonstrates that states look to policy innovators
within their region when considering which policies should be adopted and implemented
within their own states. This is in line with expectations for hypothesis 1.
With states having previously adopted performance-based funding, the regression
shows that they are 1.3 times more likely to adopt the value-added models. If I look at the
heat maps in Figure 7.2 and 7.3. There is clustering of state policy adoption based upon
region which further demonstrates the significance of the variable. Both the performance126

based funding and value-added models hold a form of accountability both instituionally
and on the part of individuals. Having piloted this similar policy, it makes sense that
states would be more likely to adopt. This is again in line with expectations for outcomes
as described in hypothesis 4.
The finding for teacher incentive programs is interesting. According to the data,
states are less likely to adopt value-added models if they have incentivized programs
already in place. Both the incentivized programs and value-added models are a form of
“reward” for teachers, with incentivized programs offering monetary benefits for
agreeing to teach in either hard-to-staff or target schools and value-added models
monetarily rewarding teachers for meeting testing objectives outlined by the state. It is
therefore surprising that if one is adopted, the other is less likely to be adopted. This may
be for a variety of reasons including policy overlap, lack of additional funds to implement
both policies, or a re-focusing to have the “best” teachers in place first prior to
implementing policies focused on student test scores. Though this finding is signifigant,
as expected in hypothesis 5, there was not the expectation of a negative association.
Common Core adoption was a precursor to the Race to the Top iniatives. The
policy adoption signalled an effort to comply with newly emerging federal education
policies. What is found in the model is that federal initiatives did not coerce states to
implementation of Common Core standards, however, a component of Race to the Top
was the implementation of value-added models. It, therefore, would follow that by
signaling a desire to be in compliance by adopting Common Core, the same states would
also want to be in compliance with value-added policies. The data supports this
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assumption and found that states who adopted Common Core were more than 2.5 times
more likely to adopt value-added models. This finding does fall in line with the
expectations of hypothesis 6.
When looking at the control variables, teacher union strength, governor party,
percentage in poverty, and per pupil spending all demonstrated statistical significance
across all models. The results are in line with findings from previous research
(McLendon et al., 2006; Li, 2017; Miller and Morphew, 2017). The only difference
between this study and previous literature, is that I did not find party control of a state
legislature to play a role in policy adoption whereas previous research has reported such a
relationship (McLendon et al., 2006; Li, 2017; Miller and Morphew, 2017). This may be
accounted for the Republican governor variable, which again was significant, having an
outsized role in what education policies were adopted, especially concerning policies
such as value-added models that are tied to federal funds (McLendon et al., 2006).
In model 2, I examined the role of federal circuit court region on policy adoption.
The expectation is that states within a circuit would have similar ideologies and therefore
would mimic each other with the adoption of value-added models. The results are
presented in table 7.2. There are 12 circuit courts and omitted the DC circuit, leaving 11
circuits for comparison. There are only 10 circuits listed as variables in the model, since
one circuit court region was omitted to avoid falling into the dummy variable trap. With
that being the case, all the coefficients indicate whether each of these regions differ in
comparison with the base category which was circuit 11.
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Table 7.2
Circuit Court
Regions
Model 2

2

2

Model 2 reports hazard-ratios with standard errors.
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I find that, in general, circuit courts regions are not significant predictors of policy
adoption. The only region to come up significant is that of the third circuit court region
which contains the states of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. This coefficient
indicates that states in the third circuit court region were on average more likely to adopt
value-added models than were states in the 11th circuit court region (the latter includes
Florida, the first state to adopt this policy. In contrast, being in other circuit court regions
does not increase nor decrease the likelihood of adoption in comparison to states in the
11th circuit court region. This suggests that what was proposed in hypothesis 3 was
incorrect. About 125,000 Pennsylvania residents work in New Jersey, and almost the
same number of New Jersey residents work in Pennsylvania, according to U.S. Census
data (McCrystal, 2018). This phenomenon creates two states that share a large number of
residents and could influence the speed of policy diffusion for the region.
The results for the diffusion of value-added policies within federal circuit courts
suggests that general regional diffusion does not occur between states in the broader sense.
Instead, cue states and direct borders seem to better explain regional diffusion of the
policy. Also, the variables representing the internal state characteristics of teachers’ union
strength, population density, proportion of population in poverty, and state education
spending per pupil are all statistically significant in the expected directions in the model.
Model 3, reported in Table 7.3, estimated the relationship of geographic diffusion
and value-added policy adoption. I measure geographic diffusion as the proportion of
neighboring states that adopted value-added policies lagged by one year (Berry and
Berry, 1990). I chose to lag this measure as I expected neighboring states would wait a
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year to see how their neighbors faired after implementation. I exclude Alaska and Hawaii
from this model as they are not contiguous with the other 48 states.
For hypothesis 2 regarding border states, I find the results to be in step with
existing theories on policy diffusion and adoption. The values of the variable were
estimated by calculating the ratio of states sharing a border that had previously adopted a
value-added model. Additionally, 1-year and 2-year lags were tested and were found to
not be significant. The results for the variable not lagged are reported in this table and is
statistically significant, indicating that “border” states do influence the adoption of valueadded models. However, this finding is in contrast with previous research which found a
negative association with borders and performance-based funding (Li, 2017). Referring
back to the results from the heat maps (Figure 7.2 and 7.3), at first, I do not see much in
the way of diffusion in the east, but the further west I go on the map, the more diffusion
is present, suggesting regional diffusion. There is evidence that regional influence on the
probability of value-added policy adoption varies depending on the level of motivation to
innovate. Overall, when a state is bordered by only states that have already added a
value-added model, a state is 1.3 times more likely to adopt that policy as well. This is
because it has often been found that states like to “wait and see” if the policy is a total
failure before following their neighbors but do not like to wait too long for fear of
missing out on the benefits (Berry and Berry, 1990).
When looking at the variables, what is interesting is that unlike previous literature
that found statistical significance concerning gubernatorial and legislative state control
influential in policy diffusion (McLendon et al., 2006; Berry and Berry, 1990), the results
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for this study do not corroborate that finding. For this model and the value-added policy,
I did not find that either political party control variables to be statistically significant in
explaining the diffusion of the policy. This may be because the federal government is
pulling the purse strings through Race to the Top initiatives and states are following suit
based upon what their “neighbor” is adopting in the way of policy which other studies
have shown (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017).
Conclusions
The overall results of the quantitative analysis of this research strongly support
the argument that cue states, prior adoption of performance-based funding, prior
adoption of Common Core standards, and the higher the proportion of bordering states
that have adopted the policy all increase the likelihood that a state with adopt a valueadded policy. Also, it is worth noting that though the prior adoption of teacher incentive
policies is statistically significant in the reported models, it is that the previous adoption
of incentives reduces the likelihood that a state will adopt a value-added policy. The
explanation behind this finding is that states only have enough resources to focus on the
implementation of a few policies within a policy domain, in this case education (Madsen,
1994; Paciotto and Delany-Barmann, 1994; Crampton, 2004). Thus, a state would lack
the funds and potentially the manpower needed in order to implement both value-added
models and teacher incentives.
Diffusion through cue states and border states allows for a greater understanding
of a policy implementation, thus increasing one’s know-how competencies since,
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Table 7.3
Border Diffusion
Model 3

3

3

Model 3 reports hazard-ratios with standard errors.

133

essentially, it is “learning by doing” or experience (Rowland, 2020). Further reinforcing
this argument is the finding that all cue states essentially serve as role models for their
fellow states. Cue states serving as representatives should reasonably have more time and
possibly more resources in respect to other states to become experts in the particular
policy (value-added models) as they have had an extended amount of time to pilot and
implement the policy.
Quantitative analysis of the pre-existing data on mechanisms for policy diffusion,
though, offers mixed results. In this study, control variables for governorship and state
legislative party control were found to be statistically significant in one model, but not
the other. Results in Table 1, which depicted the role of the governor as statistically
significant, still did not find the state legislature to effect policy adoption. When
considering Table 3, which looked at the significance of border states, neither the role of
the governor nor the state legislature was found to impact policy adoption. This may be
due to the out the outsized role of either the governor for Table 1 or the federal
government initiatives for Table 3; both of which hold the purse strings for implementing
states and have coercive tactics at their disposal. Moreover, experience by the governor
with prior policy may also contribute to their role in driving policy (McLendon et al.,
2006).
Concerning the models themselves, it is worthy to note the analyses of this study
further reinforce the greater predictive power of separating explanatory variables into
various statistical models to demonstrate reasons for policy adoption. Border states may
overlap and conflict with cue states and not demonstrate the full picture for the diffusion
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effects. Thus, any statistically significant factors that increase the likelihood of adopting
value-added models can be seen in conjunction with factors that showed significance in
previous literature. These outcomes also supported many previous arguments that internal
state factors also contribute to a state’s ability to innovate (McLendon et al., 2006; Berry
and Berry, 1990).
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion, Implications, and Further Work
This study began as an endeavor to understand the conditions under which state
governments adopt new meritocratic policies such as value-added models for K-12 public
education. I conceptualized the adoption of the policies to be a function of diffusion with
regional influences playing key roles in the rates of policy adoption. Further, this study
differs from previous research with a focus on demographic, economic, and political
characteristics of the states (McLendon et al., 2006). Previous programs similar to valueadded models have budget allocations directly tied to campus performance and held that
campuses may lose funding if they “fail to perform adequately” (McLendon et al., 2006).
Additionally, previous research found that Republican-controlled states may favor
meritocratic policies because these initiatives offer elected officials the strongest
advantage for building up accountability pressure (McLendon et al., 2006; Beyle, 1999).
In contrast, Democratic-controlled states, who tend to be less ideologically inclined to
enact a government-accountability agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Further, it has
been found that a congressional minority will, after they themselves become the majority,
seek to oversee more actively the programs of the opposition of the former minority
(Hofferbert, 1966).
Building on these previous findings and using event history models on a panel
dataset of 50 states in the US over 5 years, this paper seeks to investigate what influences
the adoption of meritocratic policies such as value-added models by states in the context

136

of the Race to the Top legislation. Based on the review of the extant literature, I
developed a conceptual model to empirically investigate this research question.
The study looks at six key variables: border influences, regional influences
(including federal circuit court region and cue states), prior merit-based initiatives (such
performance-based funding and teacher credential incentivization), and Common Core
standards laying the groundwork for compliance with policy using a proverbial monetary
carrot and stick.
This research emphasizes the need to examine education policy diffusion as not
just a temporal process, but one made up of various stages (Ampaw and Jaeger, 2011).
This implies that policy makers working with states to adopt new education policies
should consider implementation issues and provide distinct support mechanisms at each
stage. Additionally, the impact of federal incentives on the rate at which states adopt
policy innovations had not previously examined. To combat this, one factor examined in
this work is the time of policy invention. There is also a growing trend toward the
nationalization (Welch and Thompson, 1980) of social, economic, and political policies.
This study found a positive correlation between states that have adopted prior
performance-based funding initiatives that trickle-down from policies found in higher
education to K-12 public schools. This is significant because once the door to diffusion is
opened in one direction, we may find that policies trickle up from K-12 to higher
education as well. This would mean the public school system is looked at more as a
cohesive whole rather than parceled out pieces (individual school districts) as I currently
characterize the system.
137

I also found that both cue and border states positively affected whether a state was
more apt to adopt value-added models. This demonstrates a learning component that
diffuses along with policy. Once a cue state has piloted a new education policy, border
states can then learn from prior implementation and course correct any challenges in their
own state at which point I should see further policy diffusion.
It was discovered that if a state adopted Common Core standards, they were more
likely to adopt value-added models. The two policies build off each other with Common
Core setting the groundwork for teacher standards and goals for each grade level
benchmark and value-added models holding accountability on the part of the classroom
teacher to ensure the standards and goals are adhered to and learning gains are met. It
would, therefore, make sense that if state adopted one policy, they would become more
apt to adopt policies that fall within the same domain.
States that adopted teacher incentive programs were shown to be less likely to
adopt value-added models. This may be due to the five core issues discussed in previous
chapters of reliability, validity, bias, transparency, and fairness (Amrein-Beardsley et al.,
2020). This also may be due, in part, to budgetary restrictions within the state. Prior
research has shown that as education becomes a lower priority within a state, there is both
a reliance on federal dollars and less likelihood for innovation (Willner and Grönblom,
2009). It would therefore stand to reason that if a state has already implemented one
policy that rewards teachers, such as incentives, then they would be constrained to be
able to implement yet another through value-added models.
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Though states within the same federal court circuit region may indeed at times
share similar ideologies and goals (Broscheid, 2011), this does seem a common push to
foster education policy innovation between the states. Instead, I found no correlation
between states that were within the same federal circuit court region and policy diffusion.
However, in line with prior research, I did find the control variable for party control of
the governorship to be significant (McLendon et al., 2006), which gives credence to the
robustness of my findings and builds upon what is previously understood in education
policy diffusion.
This study has furthered the understanding of policy diffusion among states by
empirically demonstrating that external determinants are important to understanding
diffusion. Previous studies have focused on the internal makeup within states when
explaining why a policy would diffuse. As discussed, previous findings demonstrated that
factors such as partisanship within the state were critical to the understanding of why
policies were adopted. However, this study showed that factors occurring outside the
scope of internal determinants were just as critical. The results derived from the border
states model illustrated this point, as no internal determinant controls were found to be
significant. However, the imitation and normative pressure of bordering a state was
significant and demonstrates the importance of looking at both factors internal and
external to a state to have a full understanding of why policies diffuse.
Race to Top Coercion
A component not looked at within this study was coercion. This, however, is an
important element to discuss since coercion could help to explain why states chose to first
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adopt Common Core standards and later advance those standards with Race to the Top
and with-it value-added models. A study conducted in 2017 looked specifically at the
increase in policy adoption rates under Race to the Top (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017).
They found that part of the explanation for this general increase in policymaking activity
has to do with the structure of the competition itself, being an uncertainty about what
dynamics would need to be put in place in order to win federal funds. States that chose to
participate in the competition portion of Race to the Top devoted state resources to adopt
policy reforms that the state thought would increase their chances in each round of the
competition (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017). They do note that policy diffusion, which
is looked at specifically in this study, also seems be at least partly responsible for the
national influence of Race to the Top (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017). They show that
Race to the Top leveraged the forces of both “vertical and horizontal policy diffusion” in
order to encourage legislative activity across states (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017).
Though the findings did not expressly point towards coercion of policy adoption
through Race to the Top initiatives, in a study conducted by Howell and Magazinnik
(2017) found that coercion through the use of monetary incentives did encourage many
states to adopt value-added model policies. Howell and Magazinnik (2017) surveyed state
legislators in the spring of 2014 and asked state legislators to reflect on the importance of
Race to the Top for the education policy deliberations within their states. They also found
that roughly one-third of legislators reported that Race to the Top had either a “massive”
or “big” impact on education policymaking in their state. Additionally, 49 percent
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reported that it had a “minor” impact, and only 19 percent claimed that it had no impact
at all.
When considering the enactment of policies such as value-added models after the
rollout of Race to the Top, it was found that states around the country enacted these
policies at a much higher rate in the aftermath of Race to the Top than prior to its
announcement (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017). It was found that between 2001 and
2008, states on average only enacted about 10 percent of these policies. In contrast, in the
years between 2009 and 2014, 68 percent of the same types of policies were enacted and
consequently adoption rates increased every single year thereafter (Howell and
Magazinnik, 2017). According to the study, the rate of increase appears higher than what
was predicted if you simply projected the slope of change observed between 2007 and
2008. By looking at preexisting trends, it would have taken states multiple decades to
accomplish what, in the wake of Race to the Top, was accomplished in less than 5 years
(Howell and Magazinnik, 2017).
The study found that even states that did not win additional funding through the
initial Race to the Top competition, still had heightened policy activity. Howell and
Magazinnik (2017) surmise that to improve their chances of winning additional funding,
all participating states had incentives to adopt new education policies to demonstrate their
willingness to comply with Race to the Top mandates and hopefully increase their
chances of winning. They found that in a competition with private bid, but an undeclared
number of winners, many participating states had incentives to seek higher scores by first
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enacting some of the policies that Race to the Top touted (Howell and Magazinnik,
2017).
These findings are important not only because they demonstrate an increase in
policy adoption, but in the aftermath of Race to the Top, policy adoption rates began to
increase in all states regardless of funds rewarded (Howell and Magazinnik, 2017).
Additionally, their study fits in with existing theories of policy diffusion and
demonstrates further reasons for enactment of education policies. It is through better
understanding of this coercion component, which is tied to federal purse strings, that
there is a more complete picture of why certain educational policies, such as value-added
models, are implemented within states.
Policy Entrepreneurs
In addition to looking at federal coercion, policy entrepreneurs also need to be
looked at further as a supplement to this research on policy adoption. Policy
entrepreneurs, defined as individuals whose actions promote dynamic policy change
(McLendon et al., 2006), also need to be considered. In their study concerning policy
change, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) found that the structural features of American
federalism help shape policy trajectories, as previously suspected, but that individual
actors also matter. Further, entrepreneurs facilitate change by redefining problems,
refashioning policy images, developing potential solutions, and mobilizing (Baumgartner
and Jones, 1993).
One study that was similar in nature used Event History Analysis along with
survey data to examine the roles played by entrepreneurs in advancing school-choice
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legislation (Mintrom, 1997). It was found that the presence and actions of entrepreneurs
significantly raised the probability of a state enacting the reforms (Mintrom, 1997). In my
study the policy entrepreneur would be the Obama Administration and their roll out of
Race to the Top initiatives. The administration sought to build upon prior policy (No
Child Left Behind) with additional meritocratic principles. By also tying federal
education funds to the policy, the administration helped to facilitate the diffusion of the
policy.
With the myriad of national organizations of policy specialists and governmental
officials currently in existence, this may lead to a decrease in communication among the
states, and in turn would lead to less opportunity for states to exchange policy ideas
amongst themselves (Welch and Thompson, 1980). The example policy used within this
study is skewed toward those that have completely diffused. Because of this, the sample
is biased in favor of the fast diffusers. A spurious relationship might be introduced
between time of invention and time of diffusion. (Welch and Thompson, 1980).
Adding to this, the federal government is partly responsible for the “time” effect
in two ways. Over time the federal government has entered into more and more policy
areas. Since the nineteenth century there has been a marked increase in the number of
policies that have federal incentives (Welch and Thompson, 1980). Additionally, as the
federal government has entered into so many policy arenas it has stimulated the
development of “interstate organizations of public officials” within all levels of
government. These organizations facilitate policy diffusion by providing additional
opportunities for state officials to exchange ideas. Some may have been established
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specifically to help with federal programs. It is because of this that the effects of the
federal incentive and of the time of invention would be very difficult to distinguish
(Welch and Thompson, 1980). This shows evidence of the influence of both internal
determinants and regional diffusion which is seen in both the Welch and Thompson
(1980) study as well as mine.
For my study, the internal determinants would comprise of variables that look at
Common Core, performance-based funding, and teacher incentive adoption. Regional
diffusion entails using cue and border states, along with a state belonging to specific
federal circuit court region. It is the combination of these determinants that I have a full
scope of why education policy may diffuse.
Accountability Policies and Where We are Headed
In addition to policy entrepreneurs being a catalyst for policy adoption,
accountability policies may also further diffuse due to state compromise and internal
determinants, along with compliance with federal mandates. There has been an
emergence of these meritocratic policies (McLendon et al., 2006; Mintrom, 1997; Welch
and Thompson, 1980) and that value-added model mandates are artifacts of failed reform
efforts toward either accountability or budgeting. In other words, a political compromise
becomes acceptable to both proponents and opponents of accountability and budgeting
(McLendon et al., 2006).
The findings lend support to the general understanding in the literature that both
state and federal influence to adopt an education policy is moderated by political
partisanship and a state’s region. I argue that federal coercion, along with the regional
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and political contexts, matters in the adoption of meritocratic policies such as valueadded models (Jha et al., 2019). The findings are consistent with the argument by some
scholars that states having already implemented prior meritocratic policies are more
likely to continue that trend. Therefore, it is important to separate the role of meritocratic
practices from political and regional contexts in the adoption of policies. However, the
results of the regressions do not conclusively confirm the assertion that regional
influences play an outsized role in the adoption of reforms in public education. Further,
the findings do not fully support the widely held view that “cue” states inform their
counterparts on the initial adoption of meritocratic policies, and that they are politically
aligned only with the Republican Party (Walker, 1969). The results however show that
federal education funding could be important in policymakers’ efforts in reforming public
education including the adoption of future meritocratic policies.
Additionally, in this research I saw performance-based funding (one of the first
state and federal implementation efforts of typing funds to specified outcomes within
education) first piloted in higher education. This eventually morphed into a variety of
accountability measures, including value-added models, a few decades later in K-12.
Accountability measures in K-12 were widely spread under the No Child Left Behind Act
implemented in 2002. Such measures have been expanded upon under subsequent
presidential administrations (Race to the Top with Obama and Every Student Succeeds
Act under Trump). What I am currently finding is a further diffusion of these
accountability policies found in K-12, such as learning targets, are being implemented in
higher education.
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The diffusion began as student learning outcome assessments and in 1997 many
academic units were required to develop plans to assess student achievement in their
undergraduate and graduate programs. In the Unit Assessment Plans all academic
programs identified: (a) the process followed to develop the plan, (b) desired student
outcomes, (c) measures and methods for assessing student achievement of the outcomes,
and (d) plans to use the assessment results for program improvement (Matuga and Turos,
2018; Gartner et al., 2010; Drinka et al., 2005). This was further adopted by many
universities in the early 2000’s with many departments being required to report their
assessment activities and any changes/improvements made in the units based upon their
assessment results (Learning Outcomes, 2022). Using this data, those within higher
education were encouraged to continue implementing their assessment plans. Follow up
of these assessments did not regularly occur and some schools cited that it became
obvious that without a recurring process that required assessment updates, such as a
program review, formal student assessment activities get lost in administration
changeovers, budgetary concerns, and other competing priorities (Student Outcomes,
2022).
The response in higher education currently to this monitoring problem is for many
universities to ask their departments to implement and track on a yearly basis specific
student outcomes based on courses taken, which included learning outcomes detailed by
the professors and curriculum maps. Curriculum maps are used to see how the learning
outcomes identified and developed are met within the program (Learning Outcomes,
2022).
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Example of learning outcomes include (Learning Outcomes, page 1, 2022):
“Students will be able to communicate both orally and verbally about music of all genres
and styles in a clear and articulate manner (comprehension). Students will be able to
analyze and interpret texts within a written context (analysis). Students will be able to
demonstrate an understanding of core knowledge in the course taught (application).
Students will be able to judge the reasonableness of obtained solutions (evaluation).
Students will be able to evaluate theory and critique research within the discipline
(evaluation). Students will be able to work in groups and be part of an effective team
(synthesis)”.
The achievement of outcomes will be measured through direct and indirect
means. Direct measures require students to represent, produce or demonstrate their
learning (Assessment Overview, 2022). Indirect measures capture information about
students’ perceptions about their learning experiences and attitudes toward the learning
processes (Assessment Overview, 2022).
These measures mirror standards that were implemented under Common Core by
many states in K-12 beginning in 2010 (Read the Standards, 2022). An extension of this
research paper would be to look at the diffusion between K-12 to higher education,
considering factors that lead to the implementation of student achievement outcomes (an
extension of accountability measures).
In sum, incentives provided by the federal government do help to stimulate the
diffusion of policies through the states. Further, incentives of direct fiscal aid are found to
be more effective than indirect incentives in stimulating quick early diffusion, but both
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types of federal incentives are about equal in promoting diffusion throughout all states.
(Welch and Thompson, 1980).

What Can be Further Explored
Little empirical work exists that comprehensively explores which incentives are
used at the school district level, and the characteristics and demographics of the districts
that offer incentives of different types. Moreover, limited attention has been paid to
district policies being implemented heterogeneously across a single state with a high
demand for specific kinds of teachers. The exception is work by Balter and Duncombe
(2008), who use results from a survey of district superintendents to examine the use of
compensation incentive policies in New York. They find that districts that use a range of
recruitment practices hire more highly qualified teachers, and that larger districts tend to
use a greater array of such practices. Aside from this work, the extant literature for the
most part leaves us with scarce evidence about the prevalence of districts’ use of
economic incentive policies.
Additionally, this study focused on external determinants such as state groupings,
cue states, and previous policies that could affect policy adoption. However, a more
qualitative approach could also be taken to look at the push and pull that occurs between
state officials and the federal government concerning the adoption of federal initiatives.
This would focus on the interactive effect that occurs between leaders to see if policy
mandates are simply handed down from the federal government or if states influence how
the policy is created and eventually released through the initiatives.
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Another external determinant to consider is the partisan role of the executive.
Both No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top were federal initiatives put forth by two
separate presidential administrations and under different partisan leadership. It can be
further examined to see if this presidential partisanship helped to determine the diffusion
and adoption of the given policies.
This study, like many others that are similar, focuses specifically on the correlates
of policy creation and adoption, and not on the determinants of policy decline and death.
Building upon this study, one would want to look at the theoretical, as well as
methodological perspectives in order to best expand the general understanding of
meritocratic policies along with other education policy reforms. The average lifespan of
similar policies may be a place to begin. It is by expanding the scope of the research that
I would broaden to encompass the full lifespan of an education policy, including its birth,
maturation, decline, and death.
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